SMALL WARS

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FOREWORD

Since the Small Wars Manual was published in 1940, momentous world events have dramatically reshaped the strategic landscape, while science and new technologies have altered how we interact with this changing environment. It should not be surprising, therefore, that we need to update our thinking on small wars. While the 1940 Small Wars Manual retains much of its utility, particularly when viewed within its historical context, this Small Wars rightly redefines small wars for the 21st century, describes what has changed since 1940, and identifies ways to plan, prepare for, and conduct future small wars. In addressing this changing character of warfare, importantly, this work also remains mindful of warfare's unchanging nature – a contest of human wills.

The Marine Corps has a long and successful legacy in small wars. As general purpose forces throughout the Cold War, we developed contingency plans and created the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to study and prepare for, what in the parlance of the day were called, "out of area" problems. It was our history in small wars that ensured we maintained a weather eye on countries and regions that could become flashpoints for conflict while others were focused on war on the European plain. The emerging security environment demands we sharpen our focus on this increasingly likely form of warfare.

PREFACE

The purpose of this work is to assist those charged with conducting small wars by examining the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of this increasingly likely form of warfare. This volume focuses on our strategic and operational approach to small wars, while the accompanying website addresses the wide range of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), doctrine, lessons-learned, and expert commentary on the subject.

It is the intent of this study to accomplish what T.E. Lawrence exhorted Liddell Hart to do in his book, to "… strike a blow for hard work and thinking … to preach for more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art."[1]

This work is not about large-scale conventional or nuclear war; rather, it is about that area of conflict where violent military actions take place, but where the terms of engagement are much more complex than in traditional, state-on-state warfare. Man naturally prefers clear choices: right or wrong, yes or no, black or white. Small wars seldom provide such clarity. The prosecution of small wars requires judgments in shades of gray, not black and white, and this fundamental aspect drives the manner in which the warfighter plans and conducts them. It is much easier to prosecute a war when unconditional surrender is the goal, and the enemy is well defined – conditions rarely pertaining to small wars.

This work should be read in conjunction with MCDP 1 Warfighting. Whereas Warfighting examines the Marine Corps' maneuver warfare philosophy, Small Wars describes the Corps' philosophical approach to small wars. A maneuver warfare mindset is essential for translating the strategic and operational perspectives discussed herein into meaningful action. Maneuver warfare is as applicable to small wars, as it is to any other conflict, where finding

[1] David Garnett, ed., The Letters of T.E. Lawrence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1927), 768-9.

opportunities to exploit, empowering subordinates through mission orders, and developing a fingerspitzengefuhl (fingertip feel) of the conflict are essential components of success.

This work does not supercede the seminal Small Wars Manual of 1940, which continues to provide useful insights and historical perspectives into the nature and conduct of small wars. However, the strategic and operational portions of the 1940 Manual have withstood the test of time better than the tactical sections. The 44 pages of Chapter I, and in particular, the Sections titled General Characteristics, Strategy, and Psychology, comprise the most salient and timeless lessons for today. The roughly 400 remaining pages address the tactics and execution of small wars missions, and while these chapters remain of interest, it is mostly for their role in allowing today's small wars participants to draw meaningful inferences from their historic perspectives, rather than as a primer on TTPs to be employed today.

As an edited work, the Small Wars Manual benefited from the contributions of many of those Marines who participated in the small wars of the early 20th century. It is anticipated that the Small Wars Website will facilitate a similar process whereby Marines participating in the small wars of the 21st century will be able to publish their insights and wisdom.

Our operating forces require the latest, most up-to-date TTPs, and a web-based approach matches the dynamism of the tactical realm by allowing rapid update and inclusion of warfighter input. This website *(http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil)* provides access to an extensive database on the subject of small wars to include the Small Wars Manual of 1940, Joint and Service doctrine, best practices, and lessons learned. Feedback and recommendations for new content are highly encouraged to enable a dialogue and maintain currency on the subject of small wars.

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Website: http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil

WHAT'S A SMALL WAR?

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking.

Clausewitz

Introduction

On October 23, 1983 the world turned upside down for the U.S. Marine Corps. The deaths of 241 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in a concrete slab building in Beirut, Lebanon at the hands of a suicide bomber marked the beginning of the end of an era – an era where the enemy was a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and where Marines stood guard duty without magazines inserted because the United States was not "at war." In retrospect, the Beirut bombing was a seminal event, heavily influencing subsequent Marine Corps organization and culture and ushering in the kind of profound change that seldom takes place in large organizations without the stimulus of a significant emotional event.

Orders were quick to follow: All Marines will walk post armed; Marines will not starch their utilities; Marines will not spit shine their combat boots; Marines will read professionally. These changes did not occur overnight, but looking back from today's vantage point, it is hard not to marvel at the profound changes that have transformed the Corps.

If there can be a silver lining to a tragedy as great as Beirut, it is that the Marine Corps began a great awakening to a new way of

warfare fully two decades before her sister Services. There was recognition that Marines must prepare differently, both physically and mentally, for the new challenges posed by terrorism, transnational threats, and the more dynamic security requirements of the post-Cold War world. In attempting to discern the nature of this changing security environment and to develop appropriate courses of action, some were quick to say, harkening back to the Corps' small wars legacy, "been there, done that."

But is it just a question of back to the future? Or, is conflict in the new millennium fundamentally different? The short answer is yes to both. Meaning, while many small wars fundamentals remain unchanged, there are significant threats and challenges that are without precedent. It is the intent of this work to examine these emerging threats and convert the challenges they present into opportunities for improving our capabilities to provide for the national defense.

This "yes to both" answer also means that the *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 remains a relevant work worthy of our attention. Thus, this volume does not supercede the original, but builds upon its solid foundation to examine those important new characteristics arising from the historically unprecedented threats of the 21st century.

Small Wars Defined

We must start by defining our terms. What is war and its derivative – small war? In its most elemental form, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[2] Clausewitz further elaborates this simple formulation by explaining that compelling an adversary to do one's will is thus the object of war, while the means used to accomplish this object is physical force.[3] In small wars, just as in large-scale conventional

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[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

[3] Ibid., 75.

wars, the *object* remains compelling the adversary to do one's will. Unlike conventional wars, however, in small wars the *means* available to compel ones adversary into compliance varies across a broader range of means from pure diplomacy reinforced by the credible threat of force, to large-scale conventional combat operations. In Clausewitz's lexicon, "the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."[4] It is because war is an extension of politics by other means that this political objective is always paramount.

The corollary to this proposition is that the military provides the violent physical means necessary to prosecute the war and thereby extend politics by other means. However, a fundamental shift has taken place that requires expansion of this corollary. Military forces of the 21st century provide a wider range of policy options than Armies and Navies of Clausewitz's day, being capable of a broad spectrum of actions to include engagement activities, information operations, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and conventional combat operations (see Appendix A "Types of Small War Operations"). **Small wars are thus an extension of warfare by additional means, providing political leaders with a range of military options beyond just physical violence with which to further political objectives.** One need only review a sample of major operations of the 1990s to appreciate this increased range of operations: domestic support for the Los Angeles riots, western firefighting, and response to numerous natural disasters; peace operations in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo; counter-drug operations in Latin America and along the U.S. – Mexican border; national assistance for humanitarian de-mining operations in Cambodia and Laos; and humanitarian assistance in areas as diverse as Somalia, Bangladesh, and Rwanda; all these missions bracketed by major combat operations against Iraq in 1990 and 2003. This range and frequency of military operations is unprecedented in our history.

[4] Ibid., 87.

Small wars are most often waged between asymmetrically empowered adversaries – one larger and more capable, one smaller and less capable when measured in traditional geostrategic or conventional military terms. This is not to say that small wars necessarily involve limited resources and small units. For example, Vietnam was a small war, a conflict in no way "small" in the conventional sense of the term. Paradoxically, small wars can be quite big when measured in terms of size of formations employed, numbers of personnel involved, numbers of casualties sustained, or amounts of resources expended. It is thus the **political/diplomatic *context*** in which the war is fought that determines whether it is a "small war" and not the size and scope of resources expended, or the specific tactics employed. Additionally, **the political/diplomatic context in which the small war is set determines the conflict's characteristics far more than the theoretical or actual military capabilities possessed by the participants.**

Conventional wars can transition to small wars, and small wars can escalate into full-scale conventional wars when the strategic/diplomatic context changes. This distinction has practical implications and is not just an exercise in academic labeling and classification. If such a hybrid war was anticipated and planned for, military planners might choose to consider the initial conventional combat phase as the shaping phase, rather than the decisive phase. In such a case, the stability phase might then be planned as the decisive phase. In short, if our political objectives can only be accomplished after a successful stability phase, then the stability phase is, de facto, the decisive phase. Recognizing the potential for such radical phase changes from conventional war to small wars would enable planners to better anticipate force requirements and to construct more agile strategic plans. A seamless transition from one phase to the other should be the goal, regardless of whether this can always be realized in the field.

In small wars, survival interests of the greater power are not immediately at stake, although it is certainly possible that a small war unsuccessfully prosecuted could lead to a more serious situation

where survival interests do become involved. Thus, small wars must not be viewed as somehow less important than big wars. Any activity that entails the use or credible threat of force must be handled with the utmost seriousness of purpose and resolve.

Significantly, because of the asymmetry between the opponents, the "lesser" power will of necessity adapt to ensure the conflict is not conducted in a manner where mass, scale, and superior economic output can easily defeat it. Adversaries will avoid fighting on terms that would allow them to be attrited into submission by overwhelming force – the prototypical American way of fighting conventional wars – or by the transitory effects of a rapid precision strike campaign. Thus, small wars are potentially long wars, making pre-determined exit strategies and rigid timetables unrealistic and counterproductive.

In contrast to typical large-scale conventional wars, diplomatic and political imperatives maintain a clearly ascendant role over the military, thus demanding especially close coordination amongst all relevant governmental agencies – especially between the State Department and the Department of Defense.

Small wars may be protracted because diplomacy remains operative, necessarily circumscribing the level of violence and destruction. The objective is often a coming to terms – an agreement - rather than complete collapse or unconditional surrender, making a more modulated approach essential. The increased likelihood of protracted operations in small wars contrasts sharply with warfighting concepts that anticipate smaller, lighter, technologically empowered forces conducting rapid and decisive operations. Persistence may very well be more important than speed in small wars, where resolve and the tangible commitment of boots on the ground are more important commodities than raw firepower. This politically constrained application of force is the primary reason for the term "small" war.

Small wars typically do not involve a declaration of war.

Small wars are more common than state-on-state conventional wars. While the United States was involved in four big wars in the last century, it participated in well over 60 small wars and lesser contingencies.[5]

While every small war is unique, in important respects significant to the military planner, there are common attributes that justify categorization under the collective term – small wars. These common attributes dictate that small wars must be prepared for, planned for, and conducted differently than large-scale conventional wars.

[5] John Collins, *America's Small Wars* (New York: Brasssey's, 1991), 13.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT'S NEW ABOUT SMALL WARS?

We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state: only states could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the survival of other states. Indeed posing such threats, and meeting them, created the modern state. In such a world, every state knew that its enemy would be drawn from a small class of potential adversaries. This is no longer true, owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. The change in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone.[6]

Philip Bobbitt

Strategic Environment

Most obviously, the geostrategic landscape has been remade since 1940, leaving the United States as a preeminent power with global interests and responsibilities. The old ideological threat of communism as manifested throughout the Cold War has been replaced by multifarious ideological and religious extremist, criminal, and opportunistic threats. In contrast to the bipolar world most familiar to today's senior decisionmakers, the return to a multipolar world with one superpower, a situation which some have called a uni-multipolar world, creates a geostrategic environment reminiscent

[6] Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002), xxi.

of the early 20th century – a time when the United States was involved in numerous small wars.[7] The current strategic environment, if judged by these historical standards, will be a period when the probability of large-scale conventional warfare is diminished in relation to small wars. Released from the artificial constraints imposed during the Cold War era, this more dynamic international environment suggests that smaller states and even non-state actors, empowered by both weapons and information technology, will rise in relative strategic importance.

In addition to facilitating a change in the political environment, technology is also changing the character and conduct of warfare. The confluence of economic and technologic power invests minor states, sub-national groups, and even individuals, with offensive capabilities formerly reserved solely for the nation-state. Weapons of mass destruction and mass effects have radically increased the potential damage sub-state actors can inflict at the same time information technology has greatly facilitated their reach to a global scale.

During the modern era, nation-states were discrete entities with largely intelligible goals and interests. By contrast, today's newly empowered quasi-nation-states and non-state actors significantly increase the number of variables the military planner must assess in order to intuit the character and composition of the threat. Obviously adding non-state actors to a list of countries of concern is a clear-cut example of this increase, but because non-state actors tend to be more dynamic and changeable than state actors, the complexity of analysis increases exponentially with the addition of non-state entities.

While there has been a tremendous amount of discussion and analysis about how the conduct of war is changing with the introduction of long-range precision strike and ever improving

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[7] Samuel P. Huntington, "Global Perspectives on War and Peace or Transiting a Uni-Multipolar World," Bradly Lecture Series (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 11 May 1998).

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), warfighting is also changing in significant ways beyond these obvious and highly touted technical improvements. Our small war adversaries are not likely to provide traditional combat formations (brigades, divisions, etc.) for us to target because they know too well that they cannot survive in the environment our technical capabilities have created. Ironically, the interplay of our superior military capabilities with the recognition of this fact by our adversaries will ensure the character of future wars will be such that our "asymmetric" technological advantages will be substantially diminished. In his war manifesto, bin Laden declared, "that due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e., using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words to initiate a guerrilla warfare, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it."[8] Just as our preeminent large-scale conventional and nuclear capabilities of the 20th century pushed warfare after World War II to guerrilla and insurgency warfare, so the information, sensing, and strike capabilities of the 21st century will push the inevitable competition and conflict of this century toward small wars. In these small wars, we may be forced to fight on terms far removed from our traditional way of war where massive firepower and mass production trumped all other capabilities.

In the past, the United States' true and undeniable asymmetric advantage was its economy. In simplest terms, we could always produce more and thereby destroy more than any adversary. In the new, more disquieting world **we will no longer be able to rely so definitively on mass, our formerly unassailable strength**. While students of military history have always known that a better led force could win operational and tactical victories against a larger, better equipped foe, it was also recognized that when vital interests were at stake, strategic victory would normally accrue to that nation-

[8] "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," in Alexander and Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001), Appendix 1 A, p. 11.

state with the greatest number of battalions. Now however, new technologies and increasing economic interdependencies may be placing this principle of mass in jeopardy.

While our tremendous technological advances are important, their most significant impact will be more in how they establish the context and character of future conflicts rather than how they directly contribute to the actual prosecution of combat operations. This phenomenon is analogous to the impact of nuclear weapons during the Cold War where nuclear weapons were not employed, but their presence had a decisive impact on the character of conflict. Thus, the relatively simplistic application of firepower may have to be replaced by the more subtle orchestration of all elements of national power (military, political, economic, diplomatic, social, informational, and legal).

Iraqi reactions to our combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom exemplify this point. The Iraqi military understood they could not compete in the conventional military environment our technology created so, not surprisingly, they chose not to do so. Thus, our conventional offensive phase merely set the conditions (shaped the environment) for decisive operations to be conducted during the inherently protracted stability and support phase. While the U.S. military's technological advancements used to rapidly prosecute the offensive phase were new, the Iraqi reaction to them was age-old. From the earliest recorded history of human conflict, the lesser military power has seldom simply capitulated in the face of overwhelming military strength, but has reverted to asymmetric strategies, such as insurgent warfare, to continue the conflict on terms that make their success, if not inevitable, at least possible. In short, you can't win a game of poker if your opponent insists on playing spades.

Technology is also having a tremendous impact on our ability to gather, process, and disseminate intelligence. However, as with the weapons and C4ISR technologies mentioned above, the accompanying procedural and intellectual innovations will be equally if not more important to our overall intelligence efforts than

improved hardware and software. For example, the military planner has traditionally viewed the world through the lens of the nation-state, providing a clean and logical way to divide the world. As a result, the military planning system is built upon this premise. Intelligence organizations produce country studies and country books that describe the threat, while analysts tend to focus on specific countries. This is perfectly logical, since as the briefest glance at the globe reveals, all the worlds' real estate, with the exception of Antarctica, is claimed by a state. Certainly, the growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other regional alliance structures have caused some shift in thinking and a recognition that regions are worth examining holistically. But even under this broader construct we are still looking to the state as the primary building block with inadequate emphasis on sub-national organizations and groupings. Small wars require us to decompose the problem into smaller pieces, below the state level, in order to get the fidelity necessary to successfully understand and cope with new non-state threats. In addition to focusing on characteristics of a nation-state, **we will instead have to focus with greater resolution on the cultural, ethnic, religious, societal, and economic micro-climates that comprise the nation, region, or organization.**

Nature of the Threat: Matrix Organizations – Threat Matrices

Our most challenging and likely most prevalent adversaries of the future will be matrix threats. As explained below, matrix organizations can combine into a threat matrix creating a truly multi-dimensional security challenge. This matrix within a matrix may sound confusing at first glance, but it is actually a very simple way to describe a very complex threat. Our adversaries are challenging us to a game of three dimensional chess, and while we may have a soft spot for checkers, we will be obliged to follow their suit.

Matrix Organizations

In response to an increasingly complex business environment, many companies have established what is described in business jargon as matrix organizations. In this case, matrix means an

organizational structure in which two or more lines of command, responsibility, or communication may run through the same individual. Most often this means that a functionally organized company establishes project teams composed of individuals from throughout the organization and possibly even drawn from sources external to the company, to accomplish a specific task or project. This corporate approach to task organization allows companies to maintain specialization in key technology or skill areas, while ensuring the most efficient use of these specialized resources by having them contribute their unique expertise to multiple projects concurrently.

For example, if the G-3 shop, a traditional functional staff section, established an operational planning team for a specific planning task by calling on specialists from the other functional G sections, they would have created a temporary matrix organization. The motivation is to get the most bang for the buck by efficiently applying the best expertise for the task at hand by drawing on functional reservoirs of specialization (G shops in the example). The fluid and agile characteristics of this organizational design, that make it so appealing to those employing this structure, are the same characteristics that make the analysis and assessment of opposing matrix organizations so difficult. This dynamic demands changes to our intelligence processes.

Threat Matrix

Matrix organizations do not exist in isolation. Matrix organizations combine, cooperate, and compete with other matrix organizations. This internal flux (ever changing tables of organization), and external flux (changing allies and adversaries) can be daunting to grasp unless these relationships are described in terms of a threat matrix.

Matrix organizations, as just described, provide a useful analogy given the current strategic environment. When considering small wars, it is necessary to view the world as composed not just of nation-states, but also as a collection of matrix organizations where state and/or non-state actors join together for a given task or desired

outcome. Analysts focused solely on countries could thus overlook very significant organizational structures. Analysis must be sufficiently flexible to recognize that the threat matrix will look different for every objective and at any given place in time. It is not a static network, but a constantly varying admixture of interconnected participants, the very antithesis of traditional order of battle structures prevalent during the Cold War.

Newly empowered non-state actors defy easy categorization because their organization (structure, membership, alliances), and objectives are constantly changing and are much less formal than typical state-oriented groups. This new dynamism is an important distinction given the contingency of the organizational relationships - individuals or groups connected for one objective could be completely unconnected for another, thus making the specific circumstances - the context - the critical determining factor. The threat matrix below graphically represents this point.

CONTEXT				
	Group A	**Business Consortium**		
	Time X	√		
	Time Y	√		
	Time Z	√		
	Group B	**Terrorist Organization**		
	Time X	√	√	
	Time Y	√		
	Time Z	√		√
	Individual C	**Super-Empowered Individua**		
	Time X		√	√
	Time Y	√	√	
	Time Z		√	
	Country D	**Nation-State**		
	Time X	√		
	Time Y			√
	Time Z			
		Monetary Gain	**Anarchy**	**Anti-Globali**
				PRINCIPAL OBJECTIV

Reading vertically, it is possible to identify for any given time (X, Y, or Z) objectives held in common by the various groups. These areas of common interest for a given time (√) create grounds for possible cooperation, either tacit or overt amongst these

organizations.[9] This temporal variation is a key aspect when analyzing organizational strategies and objectives. If an organization is highly flexible and subject to rapid change and reconfiguration, a competing organization will have to be able to detect and respond to these changes even faster if it is to control the tempo of the competition or conflict.

Al Qaeda is a good example of a highly flexible matrix organization. It is transnational, with elements spread globally. While there was a charismatic hierarchy topped by Osama bin Laden, the operational organization was relatively flat, giving Al Qaeda the ability to function in a decentralized manner, only requiring broad guidance (mission orders/commander's intent) from above to conduct violent terrorist activities. Organizationally, Al Qaeda did not achieve its extensive global reach and lethality until joining with Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in 1998. Al Qaeda as we know it today is thus inherently a matrix organization.

While many Al Qaeda members are strongly ideologically motivated, many others who participate in Al Qaeda activities, or who simply support and sustain the organization, have non-ideological reasons, most often economic, for cooperating. Thus, a matrix organization is more than simply an amalgam of multi-national groups or individuals, it is more importantly, a task-organized grouping of specialists tied together for a specific task as in a matrix corporate structure. As in the corporate model, specialists can be called in to provide specific assistance, making their expertise and their motivation the key defining variable, rather than their nationality or ideology. While many, if not most, participants share a common religious or ideological motivation, this is not a prerequisite to "membership" in the greater matrix structure. These organizational combinations are significant to those charged with countering a matrix threat such as posed by Al Qaeda, for there are no traditional boundaries – not national, not religious/ideological,

[9] It is even possible for an organizations to have different internal elements with diverse or conflicting interests at any given moment, thus at times demanding yet another level of decomposition.

not economic. This variant of the matrix organization is an opportunistically functional organization requiring the analyst to have a much more detailed and nuanced knowledge of the threat than in the past when combatants could more easily be parsed into national, religious, or ideological bins.

Small wars research, analysis, and planning will have to be like cancer research, very specific and focused on a particular strain while continuing to be informed on the larger fundamentals shared by all. General research and study will still be important, but it will not be sufficient to find the cure for the matrix threats that most endanger international health.

Given the dynamic, adaptive nature of the threat described above, it is likely that an effective countering strategy will require an equally dynamic and multi-disciplinary organizational structure. Interagency cooperation must become a reality, and perhaps the best way to facilitate this is to begin developing our own matrix arrangements amongst the various agencies. In this construct, the military planner would just as likely be a member of a "project team" or interagency task force as he or she would be a member of a traditional, functionally oriented, military-only staff.

At the operational level, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is an example of how this sort of interagency organization could work. During Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations in Somalia, the CMOC was considered the "humanitarian operations center." It was co-managed by the Agency for International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and the U.S. military. It was located at the UN headquarters to get it "outside the wire" of the military compound and thereby encourage more non-governmental organization (NGO) participation. These co-management and site arrangements helped establish credibility in the eyes of the various relief organizations.[10] As the recognized place to come for humanitarian operations information, the CMOC

[10] Ambassador Robert Oakley, "Briefing to MOUT 2000 Conference," Santa Monica, CA, 22-23 March 2000.

became vital for scheduling and coordination of transportation, equipment needs, engineer support, and security requirements. This helped establish a cooperative relationship that is not always easily developed with NGOs.[11] Similar arrangements thoughtfully organized with the cultures of the various participating agencies in mind can yield similarly successful cooperation at strategic, operational, or tactical levels. It provides a flexible framework for creating our own matrix organizations to counter our matrix adversaries.

Failed states are particularly conducive to the rise of matrix threats. Economic and political collapse leads to the inability of the state to maintain control by inviting internal and external challenges to its authority. Failed economic circumstances also create a climate conducive to petty criminal activity that often evolves into more serious and pervasive organized crime and contributes to a further decline in social capital. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has provided numerous examples of this scenario. Since crime and corruption are major contributing factors to the collapse, any small war military intervention should expect to have a heavy policing component.

Threatened and aspiring elites of the 21st century are forming matrix organizations to maintain and expand their control, thereby filling the role played by older ideological threats of the 20th century such as communism and fascism. These elites may be ruling members of failed or failing states; but they may also be cultural, religious, tribal, business, or local elites who feel their position in their respective hierarchy is threatened by modernization, economic dislocation, or the cumulative effects of globalization.

While threatened elites may resort to terrorism as a means, it is essential to understand that terrorism is not the threat. The true threat is the organization itself and the factors leading to its formation, and not the tactics that it employs. During World War

[11] Ibid.

II, we did not focus on defeating blitzkrieg; rather, we focused on defeating Germany. Just as we would have been less successful during World War II if we had focused uni-dimensionally on countering blitzkrieg, the military manifestation of Nazism, so today would we be handicapped if we limited ourselves to focusing on the manifestations of the matrix threat and not the threat itself. The first step in any small war must be to see clearly the nature of the threat – from this analysis, all else flows.

Technology

As discussed above, new technologies have re-characterized the threat such that non-state actors are empowered in ways previously unimagined. **This technological empowerment falls into two principal realms: informational effects and weapons effects.**

Ideas are the seeds of small wars, and information technology has given anyone with access to a computer the ability to spread a message globally at little or no cost. In the past it was only the state and the major media who could obtain such coverage. Information technology thus extends the potential support base of the adversary globally. This extended support base can influence global opinion and can facilitate the provision of financial, material, or personnel support to the cause. Interestingly Al Qaeda's globally dispersed operations, facilitated as they are by the Internet, make them the first truly network-centric adversary we have faced.

In our increasingly legalistic society, the subjective nature of small wars can be manipulated to our adversary's advantage. Those hostile to U.S. policies will claim in the court of public opinion that U.S. actions violate international law, for example, by claiming that preemptive actions do not meet Just War criteria. Such tactics have given rise to what has been called lawfare – the use of law as a weapon of war. Information technology is a key enabler for creating an effective lawfare campaign. A recent example was the attempted use of human shields to prevent U.S. attack of critical targets in Iraq. While ultimately an abortive attempt to use the law of war and world opinion against the U.S., it clearly demonstrates the

potential of the combined use of information technology and international law.

Technology's current role in increasing weapons lethality is widely understood and is historically consistent with the trend of improving effects and precision. However, proliferation of today's highly lethal conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction into the hands of sub-state actors is new, and the implications have created a momentous shift in our national security strategy – a new emphasis on preemption. Developments in biological, chemical, and computer sciences have also expanded the range of potential weapons of mass destruction and disruption. Enhanced weapons lethality and proliferation of WMD increase the likelihood of small wars by destabilizing the strategic environment and greatly increasing the influence of sub-state actors. These new technologies increase the risks to the homeland from direct attack and also increase the chances for small wars to escalate into regional or global conflict. Chesty Puller never had to worry that his activities in Nicaragua could precipitate a WMD attack on Washington.

Urban vs. Rural

Current demographic trends point to small wars being urban rather than rural – the opposite of those of the early 20th century. The ratio of urban to rural inhabitants is steadily increasing as indicated by the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2015 report:

> By 2015 more than half of the world's population will be urban. The number of people living in mega-cities – those containing more than 10 million inhabitants – will double to more than 400 million …. Ninety-five percent of the increase [in world population] will be in developing countries, nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas. Where political

> systems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanization will foster instability.[12]

Increasingly, the U.S. military will have to conduct operations in complex urban terrain, an environment for which it is not optimized. Would-be insurgents and terrorists are going where the people and money are, and money especially is a key component in today's environment. In Latin American countries, insurgents' repeated failure to establish footholds amongst rural populations in the countryside through the 1960s led them to reassess their means of exploiting government vulnerabilities. This caused them to migrate from rural to urban areas, where they could exploit "the establishment of teeming slums filled with poor, psychologically disoriented people whose search for a better life had yielded little more than bitter disillusionment."[13] Urbanization became an enabler for insurgents and terrorists to achieve their political aim of eroding the government's will, and presented a new small wars environment with populations so dense that a government's conventional military assets could not be effectively employed.

The classic guerrilla warfare setting is the mountainous hideout, the dense forest, and the wild jungle. These settings offered the cover, protection, and sustenance needed for insurgent forces. These remote and inaccessible settings provided a safe and secure home base. Today, dense urban terrain provides similar safe-haven to the urban guerrilla or terrorist. Information technology greatly facilitates dispersed insurgent and terrorist urban operations in the same way our improved C4ISR capabilities are allowing us to fight on a dispersed and non-contiguous battlefield. Multiple means of communication allow planning and execution of operations without the need to mass. Individuals need never meet to perform their assigned tasks and may in fact never know the true identities of those with whom they work.

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[12] National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts* (Washington, DC, December 2000), 6, 15.

[13] Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1990), 46.

Historically, insurgents have had to join in at least fire team or squad size operations to create major effects, but this is no longer necessary for two principal reasons. First, individuals empowered by technology can now create their own mass effects. Second, society's critical infrastructure is far more brittle and susceptible to systemic shock than in the past when populations, power generation, and food distribution were far less centralized. These changes allow many new ways for groups or individuals to create serious physical or economic harm with no need to conduct any form of traditional massed operations. While the rural guerrilla remains a potent force, as evidenced by ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Columbia; increasingly, the complex terrain of the world's urban centers will be the insurgent's and terrorist's jungle of the 21st century.

External Factors

Experiences in the Balkans demonstrate the significant and growing impact of external forces on the conduct of small wars. **In the Balkan's case, there were five primary categories of external participants: UN sponsored forces, NGOs, members of ethnic or national diasporas, Muslim "freedom fighters," and the media.** The most visible and numerous external participants were the civilian and military representatives from UN member nations who participated in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. NGOs also provided a significant presence while providing humanitarian assistance. Ethnic and national diasporas were a significant source of volunteers and economic support. These globally dispersed communities, connected as never before by improved information and transportation technologies, comprise a growing category of external participants who contribute significant resources in money and personnel to support their respective communities. The fourth group, international Muslim mujahideen, had a minor but important symbolic role in the Balkans. Certainly understanding their ties to terrorist groups with international reach and their potential for more substantial participation in future conflicts makes this group worthy of our attention. Finally, there was the media, who are now ubiquitous on every battlefield. They provided essential news to all who watched

or read their products, and their extensive coverage of the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans had a significant impact on U.S. policy. These five new categories of external participants represent a significant change from historical small war models and must be understood and dealt with to ensure that unity of effort is maintained and the full nature of the conflict is understood. In an earlier era, such as the Marine Corps experienced in Haiti and Nicaragua in the first half of the 20th century, external factors had a much more circumscribed role, although even then the media had a significant impact on strategic decision-making. Intelligence and operational planners must now take all five categories of external participants as seriously as the local population and indigenous forces. Intelligence activities should explicitly examine each of these categories in order to develop a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of the threat.

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

The non-military problems which you will face will also be most demanding – diplomatic, political and economic. You will need to know and understand not only the foreign policy of the United States, but the foreign policy of all countries scattered around the world. You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power. You will have an obligation to deter war as well as to fight it.

John F. Kennedy, West Point speech 1962

Tectonics

Given the importance of the non-military aspects of small wars, how can political and military leadership develop a successful strategy? How best are all the elements of national power employed and properly balanced, thus optimizing the Defense Department's contribution?

The first step is to break-down or deconstruct the strategic environment of interest into its most elemental structural components, which for purposes of this work are termed tectonics – in other words, big slow moving things analogous to the earth's tectonic plates. While complex problems are not easily deconstructed and will frequently have inscrutable or unknowable components, in almost all cases it is possible to clarify strategic and operational challenges and gain useful insights into the true character and causes of the conflict by thinking "tectonically." Tectonic fundamentals give the small wars military planner a logical framework

from which to discern appropriate strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and missions, and the very process of deconstruction is, in itself, a useful intellectual exercise. For our purposes, tectonic fundamentals are divided into *geographic*, *demographic*, and *economic* elements whose characteristics and trends are affected only marginally by discrete events or activities. Like the earth's tectonic plates, tectonic planning fundamentals are elemental and largely inexorable, subtle in immediate effect, yet predictable in their trending direction. Thus, thinking tectonically requires a clear understanding of structural fundamentals and an appreciation of the long-view of history. The tectonic questions that follow are meant only to assist the planner in thinking through and identifying the strategic issues relevant to the planning effort and are not meant to be prescriptive checklists.

One might reasonably ask why so many of the questions are state-centered. How does this approach contribute to our understanding of the new non-state matrix threat? Most importantly, it is highly relevant to understand the sea in which these non-state organizations swim. This macro-context provides essential insight into the nature and motivation of matrix threats and the sources from which they draw their strength.

Tectonic fundamentals are the foundation upon which subsequent detailed intelligence and analysis are built. It is the start point for answering that most crucial question, what is the nature of the conflict?

Geography

While technology can span great distances by ever-improving means of transportation and communication, the geographical attributes of a country or region are still a substantial determining factor in the makeup of the inhabitant's culture and institutions.

Clearly, there is a strong correlation between the natural endowments of a country and its material and societal health. Climate, terrain, natural resources, relative position to other nations,

and accessibility to the sea are strong determinants of a people's economic success and societal cohesion. Terrain and weather have traditionally played a significant role in operational planning, but in strategic planning, we examine geography not just for its impact on our military operations, but on how it is a formative factor in shaping the nature of the conflict – how it impacts the inhabitants and their institutions. From the beginning of recorded history, geography and environment have played a preeminent role.

Geographic Planning Questions:

- How are the adversary's resource dependencies (especially water, sustenance, energy) fulfilled, and how are they distributed?
- How are these dependencies trending, i.e., more or less available, self-sufficient?
- Is it a maritime or continental nation?
- Are bordering nations stable or unstable, aggressive or benign, supporting or supportive?
- Does the internal terrain balkanize the population, impede or promote mobility and commingling?
- Does the nation or group possess significant exploitable natural resources?

Demographics

First there was land, then came the people. Given the immutable fact that conflict is a clash of human wills, demography, broadly defined, plays an essential role in understanding the nature of the conflict. Population density, age, and gender distributions have a tremendous impact on a nation's productivity and proclivity for aggression. Aberrant demographic trends create fertile ground for the messianic leader who is able to scapegoat his society's woes onto another national, religious, or ethnic group.

Demographic Questions:

- What is the population density and distribution? How is it trending?

- What are the age and gender distributions?
- What are the ethnic/religious/ideological compositions?
- How homogeneous is the populace?
- Is the nuclear family intact?
- What is the level, distribution, and quality of education?
- Who are the haves? Who are the have-nots?
- Who wields political and social power and how is it wielded, i.e., hierarchical, matriarchal, patriarchal, religious, tribal, clans, parliamentary, authoritarian?

Economics

In its most basic sense, a nation-state's economy is driven by its geographic and demographic characteristics. Natural resource endowments and intellectual and social capital are the fundamental components of a viable economy. Influential writings from the Bible onward have recorded the power of money. Money and more broadly, economics, are tremendously important shaping forces in human affairs, especially human conflict. Despite the tremendous variations and volatility in economic affairs, large-scale, macro-economic trends can be forecasted and can be of significant use to the planner.

The economic momentum of advanced societies is such that radical changes in direction are unlikely barring a cataclysmic event. Thus it is possible to forecast macro-economic trends and thus identify potential sources of future conflict. As a general rule, where economies are declining or in transition, the chances for civil unrest and violence are proportionately increased. Of note, even when the planner is focused on sub-national groups, the economic tectonics of host nations and the increasingly global economy maintain a predictive utility.

Economic Questions:

- What is the economic growth rate, and is the economy in question sufficiently transparent to accurately assess this question?

- To what extent do societal and cultural institutions support economic activity (social capital)?
- How is wealth distributed?
- What is the nation's (host nation's) GDP? Is it increasing or decreasing?
- How much of the wealth of the nation is dependent on international trade?
- How efficiently are natural and human resources exploited for economic development?
- What are the societal mores regarding economic growth and wealth distribution?
- Who holds the economic power and how are these individuals interconnected?

Again, the foregoing geographic, demographic, and economic questions are not meant to be definitive or prescriptive, but rather, are meant to assist in developing a mindset with which to better facilitate small wars planning. **Combining a tectonic mindset with an accurate cultural and regional appreciation of the area of interest is the surest way to meet the strategic and operational planning challenges and establish the context in which the tactical campaign will be conducted.**

Culture

> *The French were considering banning pornography from television. A French pornographer who also writes children's novels attacked the proposed ban: "Porn is one of the fruits of the youth uprising of May 1968," he wrote, "and it is a precious cultural asset."*
>
> *Iran's Education Ministry decreed that students and teachers in girls' schools may remove their veils in the classroom; Jomhuri-e-Islami, a conservative newspaper, denounced the ruling: "The aim of this plan is to encourage nudity."*[14]

[14] Roger Hodge, "Weekly Review August 6, 2002," from *Harper's Magazine Weekly Review*, www.harpers.org/weekly-review/weekly-review.php3?date=2002-08-06; accessed 12 June 2003.

The differences and variations amongst the world's cultures make small wars inherently complex. Small wars often involve a contest for the popular support of a nation's polity, and as numerous conflicts have demonstrated, it is impossible to win the cooperation, let alone the hearts and minds, of the people without a thorough appreciation of their culture. Culture in fact comprises a significant element of the second "O" in the O-O-D-A Loop (obervation, **orientation**, decision, action). In the words of John Boyd, "The second O, orientation - as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previous experiences – is the most important part of the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act."[15] This statement by Boyd clearly ties culture to the operational art and provides a strong endorsement for pursuing cultural knowledge. It was recognition of the importance of cultural intelligence that the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was established. MCIA produces cultural intelligence products in direct support of the operating forces.

But before turning to the topic of culture, it would be useful to briefly discuss the mother of cultures - human nature. The *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 discusses, at some length, the operational requirement to understand and employ psychological concepts. The *Manual* emphasizes the essential role the human element plays in small wars, in sharp contrast with much contemporary military writing that focuses on the technical aspects of conflict. The observations of the *Small Wars Manual* remain valid, and are effectively validated and corroborated by more recent studies in behavioral science.[16]

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[15] John Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," unpublished paper, 26.

[16] e.g., "Biology as Precedent," Lionel Tiger; "Evolutionary Psychology and Violence: A Primer for Policymakers and Public Policy Advocates," Christopher Boehm; "A Theory of the Origin of Natural Law," Mark McGrady and Michael McGuire; "Coalitions and Alliance in Human and Other Animals," Alexander Harcourt and Frans De Waal.

The most consistent message from these more recent studies is that man is a competitor – a warrior. In over 3,000 years of recorded history only 268 years have been without major wars.[17] Historians Will and Ariel Durant concluded that humans are subject to inexorable biological laws regarding the struggle for existence, the selection of the fittest, and the perpetuation of the species.[18]

Biological theories on the causes of human violence deserve more attention than they have received by the military planner. While no theory alone is sufficient, biological theories are the most fundamental, and therefore provide a valuable and irreplaceable foundation for other theories based upon psychological, religious, or social considerations. Regardless of the theory though, "war still boils down to one leader of a nation [or matrix organization] wanting to impose his will on another leader and his followers."[19]

As primates, humans seek preeminence first within their community and, once successful, attempt to expand their influence to more distant communities. Accepting this, one logically concludes that war must be viewed not as an anomaly, but as a natural part of the human condition deriving from our primate heritage.[20] While primates thrive in a hierarchical community where anarchy is suppressed by alpha-male dominance and/or cultural mores, technology has introduced a new variable in the form of weapons of mass destruction, making our biologically aggressive nature more problematic.[21]

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[17] Arnold Ludwig, *King Of the Mountain* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2002), 357.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., 362.

[20] Ibid., 365.

[21] While beyond the scope of this study, research into the chimpanzee alpha-male hierarchy is worthy of further study and consideration. An anthropological approach and understanding can be a useful corrective to some of the more arcane and tendentious socio-political theories. Identifying centers of gravity based upon an understanding of chimpanzee behavior is one alternative way to view the problem, and often provides a more accurate assessment of reality than can be gotten from strictly social science theories. Military planners should consider pursuing a multi-disciplinary curriculum that combines the social and natural sciences.

This is particularly troubling when one considers that this expansionist aggression is the best-case scenario based upon the natural predilections of the healthy primate. Unfortunately, we must also consider the aberrant and criminally violent individuals who go beyond the accepted healthy and rational human aggression dictated by our primate origins.[22]

This in not an argument for biological determinism or a prediction for a future of unending and ever escalating violence, but is simply meant to point out that when developing a response to the complex challenges of a small war, it is helpful to have considered underlying fundamentals, such as human nature, as this provides context and facilitates orientation and decision-making.

Culture is human nature's most significant creation. Human culture can be classified into six categories: science, language, history, religion, art, and myth.[23] These six categories are a useful way for the military planner to consider and evaluate the contending cultures in a small war.

Science

Given our Western bent for technology, science is perhaps the easiest aspect of culture for the U.S. military to comprehend. Science and technology speak a universal language. But how different cultures approach and incorporate science and technology is not so simple. In certain western cultures, one can argue with some justification that science has displaced religion as the object of our

[22] Our primate origins also provide us the ability to create cultures and institutions that can successfully modulate and moderate our aggressive instincts. It would be wrong to assume that because we are primates we are destined to unending warfare; but to avoid this unpleasant prospect, we must appreciate the biological hand we have been dealt, and by affirming this, work consciously to direct our energies toward more constructive ends. Philosophers have long argued that man was motivated first and foremost by self-interest, dictating the need for a social contract where individuals subordinate their selfish desires to the rule of a sovereign. Scientific research of the last century demonstrates that this need for a social contract is consistent with the social arrangements established within chimpanzee and other primate groups.

[23] Ernst Cassirer, *Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1944), 68.

ultimate admiration or worship. For other cultures, especially Middle Eastern cultures, science has a more circumscribed role, perhaps in part because they see how science has supplanted religion in other parts of the world. How a culture approaches science and by extension, modernity, is an essential insight into its nature.

Language

The construct and use of language provides key insights into a culture. Historians place considerable emphasis on language as a tool for decoding culture. Word origins and syntactical usage do indeed provide a window into foreign cultures. Language training's utility, therefore, is more than simply providing the necessary mechanism to understand what an individual might be saying in the literal sense, but it is also a necessary tool for developing an understanding of what he feels and why he feels the way he does.

History

Humans are storytellers, and contemporary culture is an extension of our narrative history. History provides a culture its foundation, and as such, is an important ingredient in any contemporary conflict. Put simply, one cannot understand a culture without knowing its history, and one cannot understand a conflict without understanding its culture.

Religion

The role and influence of religion varies among cultures along a continuum from being the dominating influence to being simply a derivative consideration. As the past century's ideologies wane in importance, religion is rising to become a dominating supranational organizing principle. Like its secular antecedents, religion can be a rally point for the have-nots of the world. The September 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon have made the importance of understanding the role of religion in culture intuitively obvious.

Art

While there may be an inclination for the military planner to give art short shrift, the study of a culture's art provides important insights into what is important to that culture. Whereas language is a spoken and written key to the understanding of the intricacies of a culture; art is a visual, textual, and symbolic window into its essence. During relief operations in Somalia, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) forces produced a daily paper, RAJO, in which they sponsored a poetry contest – poetry being an important art form in the Somali culture. U.S. Special Envoy Robert Oakley said, "We are using RAJO to get the correct information into the hands of the Somali populations and to correct distortions …."[24] Oakley subsequently explained how important the poetry contest was in opening a dialogue between the two sides, thus offering a tangible example of how an appreciation of art can influence operations and outcomes.

Myth

To greater or lesser degrees, all cultures possess important defining myths. Like history, myth is closely related to the narrative nature of man since myth is really a story, objectively true or not, that is believed and passed down by a society. Myth contains dense metaphoric and symbolic meaning and thus can often be viewed as a shorthand representation for deeply held cultural beliefs. Understanding a culture's myths provides a key for unlocking its deepest mysteries, and by extension, the character of the competition and conflict in which it engages. Despite the sense conveyed by many of our high school and college mythology courses, myth is not a subject of the ancient past. On the contrary, information technology has created a new environment where myths can be generated and perpetuated with amazing ease. Large segments of the globe's population, sheltered from the harsh and brutal potentialities of physical competition and conflict (largely the same segments who have best access to computers), can create electronic

[24] Joint PSYOP Task Force, Unified Task Force Somalia, "Psychological Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope," (Ft. Bragg: 4th Psychological Operations Group, 1993), 9.

Potemkin villages (cyber myths) based upon impressions gained from the simplistic representations of the electronic media. The instantaneous nature of electronic media, and its passive reception by the viewer, encourages reliance on impressions and feelings rather than more thoughtful analysis. This contrasts starkly with an earlier time, when the primary source of information was the written media, which required active mental engagement and encouraged reflection. Modern day myths are no less mythical to their proponents than medieval notions of what lay in the dark forest or at the far reaches of the seas, regardless of whether the factual data are hiding from them in plain view. As the historian Barbara Tuchman has said, "Men will not believe what does not fit in with their plans or suit their prearrangements."[25]

Western Culture

It is ironic that as our Western civilization becomes increasingly a digitized world, the surrounding geopolitical landscape is becoming progressively less "digital" and more "analog."

This analogy requires some explanation. Dictionaries define digital as, "a description of data which is stored or transmitted as a sequence of discrete symbols from a finite set." Analog, the opposite of digital, is defined as, "of, relating to, or being a device in which data are represented by continuously variable, measurable, physical quantities, such as length, width, voltage, or pressure." More practically, one need only imagine the constant sweep of the hands of a traditional analog watch as opposed to the flashing, on and off again numbers of the digital watch to more easily understand what the dictionary is describing.

We are a digital culture. We expect our questions to be answered yes or no. We want our problems fixed now. We want our world neatly and discretely categorized into good and bad boxes.

[25] Barbara Tuchman, *Practicing History* (New York: Knopf, 1981), 33.

The U.S. military has not been exempt from this quest for the quantifiable with its increasingly heavy emphasis on operations research, modeling, and simulation. While these disciplines are of undeniable value, it is important that we not conveniently accept the neatly quantified "digital" (more rigorous) analysis over the less tangible, less quantifiable, common sense judgment call when dealing with systems and processes that are highly complex and often non-linear. Especially in a world of small wars, the palette is shades of gray and not the more categorical black or white – one or zero. By their fundamental nature, small wars require an approach more art than science, more analog than digital.

World War II and the Gulf War were both digital wars. We declared war, diplomacy took a back seat, and the military had the clear-cut objective of defeating the enemy armed forces – neat and discrete. In the words of a World War II veteran, "You live in a far more complex world than I did. Ours may have been greater and more vast in the combat and conflict, but it was much simpler in understanding who the bad guy was and what we had to do and the job we had to get done."[26] Beirut, Somalia, and Kosovo were analog wars. We were to "create conditions," "stop the suffering," and "prevent ethnic cleansing." Diplomacy continued to operate and military activities were shaped predominantly by political and diplomatic imperatives. The roles and missions of the military constantly varied given the dynamic interplay of political, diplomatic, and economic forces.

It is our digital culture that makes ours an impatient culture. We want clear results, and we want them now. Fast food and breaking news are our sustenance. Patience is not our cultural virtue, and this leads to our critical vulnerability in small wars – resolve. The greatest and most significant danger we have in entering a small war is the potential for an asymmetry of wills. **We must decide before embarking upon any small war whether we can withstand the pressures of our own impatience.**

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[26] LtGen Antony Zinni, "It's Not Nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, August 1995, 30.

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

As with the strategically oriented tectonic questions, the following operational considerations are not prescriptive, but are provided to assist in defining the problem and achieving desired effects. As mentioned earlier, there has been continuing debate over whether small wars should be viewed as simply "lesser included cases" of conventional wars. The implication of this argument was that small wars required little or no special training. Those taking this position pointed out correctly that many of the tactics and much of the training developed for conventional warfare are easily adapted to small wars applications. However, at the operational and strategic levels, this logic does not apply, and even at the tactical level, there are increasingly significant areas peculiar to small wars. Strategic and operational considerations are fundamentally different for small wars than for conventional wars: they require **closer operational cooperation with ongoing diplomatic activities** and more consideration of the overarching political objectives at lower operational and tactical echelons; they are almost always about **minimum use of force versus maximum firepower** and destruction; and they require closer and more **extensive coordination between the military and other governmental and non-governmental agencies**.

For these three reasons, small wars cannot be considered merely lesser included cases of large-scale conventional wars, but they do require special consideration. While it is certainly true that there are many complementary areas, the following operational considerations examine the need to think about small wars differently.

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FM COMMARFOR SOMALIA
TORHIIMEF/BLT ONE SLANT SEVEN
BT
UNCLASS //N01600//
OPER/RESTORE HOPE//
SUBJ/30 DAY ATTITUDE CHECK//
RMKS/1. MANY OF YOU HAVE NOW BEEN IN SOMALIA FOR A MONTH. SOME OF YOU HAVE BEEN SHOT AT, A FAIR NUMBER OF YOU HAVE BEEN SICK, THE NEWNESS OF THIS DEPLOYMENT IS WEARING OFF AND ALMOST ALL OF YOU ARE A LITTLE BIT TIRED. WE ARE NOW INVOLVED IN WHAT MAY BE THE MOST DEMANDING PART OF OUR MISSION - RESTORING STABILITY TO MOGADISHU. BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN SHOT AT, BECAUSE WE ARE NOW BUSY COLLECTING WEAPONS WITHIN THE CITY AND BECAUSE OF ALL THE OTHER THINGS I HAVE MENTIONED, IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL WE WILL START THINKING THAT WE'RE AT WAR AND WE MAY FORGET THAT OUR MISSION HERE IS ONE OF PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
2. WE ALL NEED TO STOP FOR A MINUTE OR TWO AND TAKE AN ATTITUDE CHECK. HERE ARE A FEW QUESTIONS WE NEED TO ASK OURSELVES:

- AM I STILL WAVING TO SOMALI CHILDREN? IF THE ANSWER IS NO, WE AREN'T ACCOMPLISHING OUR MISSION.
- AM I SWEARING AT SOMALIS OR BLOWING THE HORN OF MY VEHICLE WHEN I GET CAUGHT IN A TRAFFIC JAM OR CROWD? IF THE ANSWER IS YES, WE AREN'T ACCOMPLISHING OUR MISSION.
- AM I TREATING THE VOLUNTEER WORKERS FROM CARE, THE RED CROSS AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (OR NGO'S) AND THEIR SOMALI HELPERS (TO INCLUDE THOSE CARRYING GUNS) WITH RESPECT? IF THE ANSWER IS NO, WE AREN'T ACCOMPLISHING OUR MISSION.
- WHEN I'M ON PATROL AND A CROWD FORMS, AM I PUSHING SOMALIS OR POINTING MY WEAPON AT THEM? IF THE ANSWER IS YES, WE AREN'T ACCOMPLISHING OUR MISSION.

[EXCERPT FROM GENSER MESSAGE FROM MAJGEN WILHELM 12 JAN 93]

Principles for Small Wars

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, lists six MOOTW principles: **objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.** This list is remarkably similar to Sir Robert Thompson's five basic principles

of counter-insurgency: have a clear political aim (objective); function in accordance with the law (legitimacy, restraint); have an overall plan to include political, social, economic, administrative, police, and other measures (unity of effort); give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas (objective); secure your base area first (security).[27] Perseverance is not one Thompson's basic principles, but on this matter he states, "by preparing for the long haul, the government may achieve victory quicker than expected. By seeking quick military victories in insurgent controlled areas, it will certainly get a long haul for which neither it nor the people may be prepared."[28] Thompson's long experience in Malaya throughout the Emergency of 1948-1960 makes him an especially qualified commentator on the subject of small wars. The following elaborates on both sets of principles by synthesizing Thompson's principles with joint doctrine.

This work began with Clausewitz's dictum, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking." Both joint doctrine and Thompson concur in this point. Thompson's first principle emphasizes that the government must have a clear political **objective,** and he stresses repeatedly that this political objective must remain paramount and always in focus. Further, the objective must be clearly understood and credibly attainable by all parties. As Thompson explains, if this long-term objective is not first in the minds of all participants, there will be a tendency to adopt short-term ad hoc measures in reaction to insurgent or terrorist activity. Thompson draws on our Vietnam experience to make his point. Between 1956 and 1964 Vietnam's provinces were increased from 27 to 45. They were created for military and security sector commands, but lacked the administrative backing necessary for them to function effectively as provinces. The inevitable resultant failure in governance discredited the government's efforts across the board and ultimately compromised

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[27] Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 50-57.

[28] Ibid., 58.

the security they were designed to enhance. Had the military been more focused on the political objective, its commanders would have realized that reducing the number of provinces would have been the more prudent course of action, for whatever improvements they hoped to realize in security, they lost through the inability to credibly administer the new provinces. Once the nature of the conflict is understood, the military objective must be developed and adjusted so as to always remain in consonance with the primary object – the political objective.

Thompson's fourth principle also relates to the objective when he argues that priority of effort should go to defeating political subversion (political cause) and not the guerrilla. In discussing matrix warfare, it was previously argued that the focus of effort should be against the matrix threat that perpetrated terrorist attacks rather than on the terrorists themselves. In both cases though, the meaning is the same, the long-term objective must be countering the organizations and conditions that create and support terrorist and insurgent activities and not on the individual terrorists and their tactics. To do this we must correctly identify the insurgent's goals, organization, and support infrastructure and target them with a comprehensive inter-agency approach orchestrating diplomatic, political, economic, social, and military efforts.

Legitimacy and restraint go hand in glove, both being essential for decisive small wars success. Legitimacy can only be assured by operating within the law, and restraint is necessary to do this. Regardless of the outrages commited by the insurgent or terrorist, our response must always be within lawful bounds. As Thompson says, "A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law."[29] This approach does not preclude tough measures. In Malaya strict curfews, mandatory death penalty for carrying arms, life imprisonment for providing supplies or support to terrorists, and restricted residence or detention for

[29] Ibid., 52.

suspected terrorist supporters were all effectively enacted and enforced. Critically though, they were seen by the population as effective and equally applied to all. "If the government does not adhere to the law, then it loses respect and fails to fulfill its contractual obligation to the people as a government."[30]

Unity of effort is important for both conventional and small wars, but in small wars it takes on added importance because of the complexity inherent in balancing the military with the political. Interagency coordination and cooperation are essential to achieving effective unity of effort. Thompson calls this having an overall plan. Joint doctrine makes the same point, if less succinctly, by recognizing that a coordinated interagency effort is necessary for the coherent application of all elements of national power. Political, economic, diplomatic, military, and informational efforts must be effectively balanced and coordinated. There has been a great deal of analysis of the Malayan Emergency, and there appears to be nearly universal agreement that subordination of the military to the civilian, and the resultant unity of effort, was the key to British success. Again Thompson, "… there should be a proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields. Otherwise a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting results because civilian measures … are unsupported by civil follow-up action."[31] Additionally, because establishment of the rule of law is a prerequisite for success and a necessary condition before transition to indigenous control can be made, security operations are fundamentally policing and not military functions (regardless of what type force performs the function). **The biggest practical difference is that policing requires constant presence, high levels of interaction with the populace, and greater density of forces.** Whereas in strictly military operations force ratios are defined as a ratio of friendly to enemy military forces, **in policing functions appropriate force ratios are better determined by the ratio of friendly police/military**

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[30] Ibid., 54.

[31] Ibid., 55.

force to the local populace rather than a ratio of the friendly police/military force to the number of insurgents. The real goal is building security and legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, hence the need for a different force ratio metric. Recognizing the preeminence of the policing function, British authorities ensured **the military was subordinate to the civil authorities through all stages of the Malayan Emergency.** The military's role was to assist the police and support the programs of the civil government in general. Still, there were initial problems in achieving unity of effort. This was rectified by the appointment of Sir Harold Briggs as the Director of Operations. There is perhaps no better example of how a clear and logical organizational chart can have decisive results on unity of effort. Shortly upon assuming his post, Briggs formulated a plan that would stand the test of time during twelve years of the Emergency. He was able to effectively implement the plan because he had authority over all police and military activities. Unity of effort was essential to British success.

Security, or securing one's base of operations, gives the obvious material benefit of providing for the security of one's forces, while also facilitating training, planning, and force buildup. However, the psychological benefit is at least as important as the material because it gives tangible evidence of success in the minds of the populace. Everyone wants to be on the winning team, and if we are unable to secure a home base, it is unlikely we will be successful in convincing a wavering population that we can extend the necessary security to them. It is an important example of the benefits that can accrue if the populace lends its support to the government and not the terrorist or insurgent. Of note, this is not an argument for developing a bastion isolated from the indigenous populace or cantonment in secure basing arrangements. The improved situational awareness and intelligence gathered through close interaction and cooperation with the populace is the surest way to establish security and stability for both our forces and those of the general populace.

Persistence relates to will. Often the asymmetric nature of small wars forces the lesser military power into strategies that rely

upon protracting the conflict in hopes of capitalizing on an asymmetry of wills. If we demonstrate through word, deed, or policy that we haven't the stomach to stay for the long haul, our adversaries will assuredly capitalize on this fact and develop a strategy to attrite our will. Thompson discusses the need for persistence under his security principle. Perhaps he did not make it a separate principle because for him it was an implicit requirement, for here was a man who participated in a single counter-insurgency effort for 12 years. Regardless, given our cultural proclivities, we must be ever wary of entering into a conflict for which we are unprepared to stay as long as it takes to win.

Mission Analysis

As in any war, large or small, a thorough mission analysis is necessary to determine specified and implied tasks from the higher headquarters' mission statement. This also includes determining centers of gravity and associated critical vulnerabilities, determining the desired end-state, and establishing measures of effectiveness. In the case of small wars, this is not always so easy. First, there may not be a clearly articulated mission statement. Commanders may be left to intuit what is required based upon inferred information. As General Zinni has said, "It's not nice and neat – for openers, you don't get a clean hard mission that tells you exactly what you're supposed to do."[32] The highly political nature of small wars, derived in part from the fact that diplomacy continues to function, makes determining centers of gravity more complicated since it is necessary to look well beyond strictly military targets. This requires an effective interagency process to ensure the chosen centers of gravity are appropriate and adjusted as necessary to the meet the changing situation.

End-state has a very definitive connotation. In conventional warfare, defeat of the opponent's military force is a clear-cut end-state, but in small wars, the requirement may be to establish a certain

[32] Ambassador Robert Oakley, *Briefing to MOUT 2000 Conference*, Santa Monica, CA, 22-23 Mar 2000.

set of conditions conducive to peace and economic growth. Recalling the analog versus digital analogy, end-states in conventional wars tend to be digital, that is, discrete and clear-cut, while in small wars, the end-state is more likely to be analog – constantly varying.

Measures of effectiveness (MOE) vary significantly with each situation. In many cases it may be as simple as asking the question, "how are we doing today?" In Somalia, MOEs were termed stabilization indicators and consisted, among others, of the following: death rate per day due to starvation, gunshot wounds in hospitals, street price of an AK-47, and street price of sack of wheat.[33] In general, measures of effectiveness in small wars are largely subjective and highly changeable given the dynamic nature of the conflict. Poorly chosen measures of effectiveness can have dire consequences while properly chosen measures can guide a force toward constructive and effective activities. The body count in Vietnam is an example of a flawed measure of effectiveness. It did not come out of thin air, however. The heavy emphasis on the military component during the war made a measure of effectiveness like the body count appear logical when in fact it lead to outcomes counter to the desired political objectives. Attempts to increase the body count led to counterproductive emphasis on large-scale ground and air operations which were, in the end, militarily ineffectual and political damaging. Heavy bombing and large search and destroy missions caused unacceptable levels of collateral damage and diverted resources away from more effective programs such the Combined Action Program (CAP) and Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).[34] As the Vietnam example demonstrates, measures of effectiveness have a powerful influence on military operations and must be chosen carefully to ensure they are in consonance with political objectives.

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[33] Zinni, 30.

[34] Douglass Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era.: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present*, (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 119.

Priorities

Stop the bleeding. Start the breathing.
First Aid Steps

Start the feeding. Stop the bleeding. Fix the feelings.
Stability Ops Priorities

Priority of effort in stability and support operations will vary with the specific situation, but a useful methodology is to categorize tasks in the following prioritized hierarchy: physiological needs; safety and security needs; satisfactory interpersonal relations with family, friends, and society; self-esteem and personal reputation needs; and self-satisfaction needs.[35] Of note, these needs are from the standpoint of the indigenous population, and in the direst circumstances, their physiological needs must be satisfied before safety needs are fully realized. When transitioning from offensive operations to stability operations, security is usually the first priority for our forces, but it is useful to appreciate that while this priority of effort can be essential to facilitate survival of the populace from our standpoint, in the most desperate situations, physiological needs trump all. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the need for water in Basra took precedence over the need for ensuring security. Reality always intrudes on theory, and it is worth mentioning again that these planning factors are simply tools to assist the leader in assessing the situation and are not formulas or prescriptions.

Physiological Needs

The basic requirements of life: food, water, and clean air.

Safety Needs

Once physiological needs are satisfied, the desire for security, stability, and protection begins to manifest itself. Individuals hope

[35] Note that this hierarchy is an adaptation of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, modified herein for a general audience.

for freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos. Law and order is their new imperative.

Interpersonal Relations

Once physiological and safety needs are reasonably well satisfied, the need for fulfilling interpersonal relations with family, friends, and loved ones asserts itself. When unsatisfied, a person will lament the absence of friends and loved ones. Attaining a place of belonging will become more important than anything else. Everyone wants to have a sense of place, and a sense of being needed, appreciated, and belonging. This is a common trait of all human beings regardless of culture, religion, or ethnic background.

Esteem Needs

All people with healthy psyches have a need for a stable, positive evaluation of themselves. This is derived from self-esteem and from the esteem in which others hold us. Dignity, prestige, reputation, status, recognition, fame, and glory are all manifestations of the basic need for esteem. Hearkening back to the earlier discussion on the need for cultural appreciation, it is impossible for U.S. forces to succeed in facilitating these higher order needs without an appreciation and understanding of the local culture.

Planners should consider grouping identified challenges and deficiencies within each category and develop a prioritized list of tasks. The relative importance of the military component is highest for ensuring physiological and safety needs and becomes more of a supporting effort when facilitating the higher-order needs. Certainly in some situations, the mission might only dictate assurance of physiological and safety needs, but in nearly all cases this would merely be to ameliorate the symptoms and would not be aimed at fixing the causes of the conflict. Sustained solutions will in almost all cases require addressing group and personal belongingness and esteem needs. It is important to recognize that all needs in the hierarchy are interdependent. Physiological needs provide the foundation for safety needs and safety needs in turn provide the

foundation for interpersonal needs, etc. **Once fulfilled, each category of needs is then subsumed and the predominant motivation comes from the desire to fulfill the next order need.** This progressive and interdependent hierarchy explains why humanitarian operations are never long appreciated. Starving victims fed and nursed to health today will soon forget the deeds of their benefactors and in short order will be pursuing fulfillment of the next order needs - their earlier fear and hunger pangs quickly relegated to distant memory. **The small wars planner must anticipate this progression and be prepared to respond when the populace is satisfied and prepared to continue the quest for greater self-satisfaction at the next level of hierarchy.** One could say this hierarchy represents with more fidelity what the Founding Fathers called the pursuit of happiness. Our conduct of small wars must be responsive to and be prepared to cope with this innate desire.

This hierarchy of needs is analogous to the life saving steps of "stop the bleeding, start the breathing …." While it is self-evident that sustenance, shelter, and safety must be a top priority, and usually do receive top priority, it is equally important for the military to consider belongingness and esteem needs. While exceedingly difficult to do, if these needs can be satisfied, even partially, it will greatly facilitate the stabilization of a fractured society and is the best guide to creating a sustainable peace.

Maneuver Diplomacy

Maneuver diplomacy is an interagency mission that combines maneuver warfare, diplomacy, and political and economic policy to efficiently and effectively leverage all elements of national power to accomplish desired ends. Maneuver diplomacy incorporates shaping, decisive, and sustaining functions to reach desired end-states. **The goal of maneuver diplomacy is to further national goals, decrease adversary resolve, attract the uncommitted to our position, end the conflict on favorable terms, and ensure**

that conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for future conflict.[36]

The Marine Corps' maneuver warfare philosophy is perfectly suited for winning small wars because it accepts the inevitability of chaos, complexity, and friction and the preeminence of the human element. Recognizing that even the simplest things in war are difficult, maneuver warfare places a premium on flexibility and adaptability – essential attributes of a successful small wars force. As an institution organized for maneuver warfare, where mission orders and decentralized execution based upon commander's intent are the norm, the Marine Corps constitutes a highly effective force for the prosecution of future small wars.

Small war adversaries and the means necessary for effectively countering them are multi-dimensional and thus highly complex. The complexities of the matrix threat were discussed earlier. The complexity of the necessary response, simply put, derives from the fact that the indirect approach, the inherently more complex response, is best suited for success in small wars. In small wars subtlety, nuance, and the modulated application of force are often more effective than the frontal assault – be the effort purely military, or as more likely, a coordinated interagency effort.

The operational functions discussed below are merely tools to order our thinking and are not, therefore, prescriptive. It is important that we define our terms and use them correctly, but it is also important that we not become overly doctrinaire, for functions can and often do overlap.

Full-Dimensional Shaping

In purely military operations, shaping is defined as the use of lethal and/or non-lethal activities to influence events in a manner that changes the general condition of war to our advantage. In the

[36] Boyd, 139.

context of small wars, full-dimensional refers to the coordinated application of all elements of national power: political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, legal, and informational to modify or shape conditions so as to facilitate decisive operations. For example, if psychological operations are to be successful, they must be built upon a solid foundation of public diplomacy.[37] Societies just beginning their experience with new information technologies are highly susceptible to manipulation by intentionally or unintentionally distorted perspectives of foreign and state-run media. In the early years of television in this country, there was a pervasive belief that if it was on TV, it had to be true. Few questioned TV's veracity, and it was not until major cheating scandals on popular game shows in the 1950s were exposed that people began to look at TV's content with a more skeptical eye. Today's younger generations are highly skeptical of media content, whereas the older generations who grew up in the early days of TV still tend to believe that, "they couldn't say that on TV if it wasn't true." Audiences in countries just entering the information age are in a position similar to ours in the early 1950s, having yet to develop the discernment and critical eye necessary to interpret the images they are seeing, thus exacerbating the already divergent views caused by cultural and societal differences. The prevalence of these new information technologies requires that we redouble our public diplomacy and educational efforts and begin focusing on shaping the strategic international environment just as our air and special operations forces now shape and prepare the tactical battlefield.

In addition to the need to closely coordinate operational information operations within the larger public policy program, the military also has an integral part to play in strategic-level public diplomacy. In the recent case of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, it was significant that Pakistan's President Pervez Musharref had developed a meaningful relationship with the former Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, and that numerous other Pakistani military officers had had extensive

[37] Public diplomacy is the task of communicating with overseas publics.

contacts with the U.S. military. These sorts of relations, built through continuous engagement of our military throughout the world, create personal bonds that can be instrumental in successfully managing a crisis. On a tactical level, common understanding and improved interoperability between U.S. and indigenous forces built through earlier joint exercises and mobile training teams also play a vital shaping role during any crisis.

Because small wars are information wars, it is possible that successful shaping operations can be sufficient to accomplish the desired end-state and thus can become "decisive" operations.

Decisive Operations

In small wars "decisive" may not be decisive in the traditional military meaning of the term. In this context, "decisive" means achieving a clear decision or final resolution on a specific objective or goal rather than necessarily reaching a broad and definitive conclusion. Once multi-dimensional shaping has set the stage for successful decisive operations, the concerted application of all elements of national power must be used to accomplish the desired end-state. Frequently, the military will play a prominent role during this stage, but close coordination amongst all agencies is still vital for lasting success.

Decisive operations may necessarily be protracted. Tempo, not speed, is the appropriate metric for small wars because tempo is speed relative to an adversary. A force successful in controlling the tempo of operations, which is the primary goal, may still be involved in operations lasting years rather than days. If we are quicker than our adversary, if we are controlling the course of events, we are controlling the tempo and not the speed. This relationship to the adversary, within the specific context of the conflict, is the essential measure and not the sweep of the clock hand. In small wars, speed kills.

Given the current emphasis on rapid decisive operations, it is worth recalling the words of NSC 68:

> Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitely end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas …. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict.[38]

Sustaining Operations

Sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations. Enabling, maintaining, and expanding upon the successes achieved during decisive operations can be the most challenging and are usually the most time-consuming tasks in any small war. Events in Afghanistan following Operation Enduring Freedom and in Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom provide paradigmatic examples of the challenges inherent in sustaining operations. While U.S. forces quickly destroyed the Taliban and Iraqi conventional forces, they immediately were confronted with the extremely difficult task of facilitating the installation and maintenance of a viable national government. In small wars, successful sustaining operations often determine whether decisive military operations can be truly strategically decisive.

Sustaining operations may also include activities conducted external to the interagency task force, which create favorable conditions or otherwise contribute to the desired end-state. Diplomacy or peacekeeping operations in adjacent countries designed to maintain regional stability or reduce external support to hostile forces are examples of external sustaining operations.

Information and Intelligence

Small wars are first and foremost information wars. In conventional warfare, destruction is the norm, whereas in small wars persuasion is more often the objective. **This shift in emphasis from destruction to persuasion creates a radically different context.** Destruction is physical, while **persuasion is**

[38] National Security Council, *NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* (Washington, D.C., April 14, 1950).

psychological, which is why small wars are best viewed as information wars. In conventional conflicts, the warfighter's intelligence and information requirements are largely concerned with physical entities such as locations and dispositions of enemy armed forces. In small wars, these requirements are more often subjective evaluations of intentions, aspirations, and proclivities. Just as at the strategic level it was necessary to more thoroughly deconstruct the threat, so at the operational and tactical levels it is necessary to examine in finer granularity the composition and nature of the adversary. While it is true that the profile of opposing commanders has always been of interest, it is likely that in small wars, these sorts of profiles will have to be developed for much lower level participants – civil and military. What does this mean practically for those conducting a small war?

First, it must be recognized that **higher headquarters and national sources, while providing valuable intelligence and information, will not provide the necessary fidelity of information needed to conduct tactical operations.** Thus, it is the tactical commander's responsibility to gather this data from organic sources. It can be argued that such a realization could have helped prevent the surprise attack in Lebanon. The huge and expensive apparatus of the Defense Department's intelligence network was brought to bear, but was unable to supply the information necessary to effectively warn the Marines of a potential suicide attack. Reliance upon "higher headquarters" or "reachback" in small wars is to doom the mission to failure.

Commanders must ensure their entire organization becomes an indications and warnings system. One possible way of doing this is to avoid Camp Bondsteel-like arrangements that cloister our forces and instead create opportunities for greater connection with the environment and the indigenous population.[39] Only such close interaction can provide the level of understanding necessary to develop accurate situational awareness.

[39] Camp Bondsteel was established to house American peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. It was completely self-contained and isolated from local surroundings.

In March 2002, the Israeli Defense Force launched Operation Defensive Shield aimed at countering a significant escalation in suicide bombings. The IDF recognized that the only way to combat the suicide bombers was to go to their source. While appearing on the outside to be simply reprisal for past bombings, the occupation of the West Bank was instituted primarily to facilitate intelligence-gathering operations. The occupation allows Israeli intelligence to "imbed" in areas where potential bombers live and train. This presence allows the IDF to develop a level of situational awareness that could not be obtained through even the most sophisticated technical means.

> The IDF in West Bank cities and towns can amass detailed knowledge of a community, identifying terrorists and their sympathizers, tracking their movements and daily routines, and observing the people with whom they associate. Agents from Shabak, Israel's General Security Service (also know as Shin Bet), work alongside these units, participating in operations and often assigning missions. "The moment someone from Shabak comes with us, everything changes," a young soldier in an elite reconnaissance unit … [stated]. "The Shabak guy talks Arabic to [the suspect] without an accent, or appears as an Arab guy himself. Shabak already knows everything about them, and that is such a shock to them. So they are afraid, and they will tell Shabak everything." The success of Defensive Shield and the subsequent Operation Determined Way depends on this synchronization of intelligence and operations. A junior officer well acquainted with this environment says, "Whoever has better intelligence is the winner."[40]

As the above example demonstrates, either through billeting within the population, aggressive patrolling or a combination of

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[40] Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2003, 45.

both, Marines must begin developing background information from the moment they disembark in order to achieve necessary levels of situational awareness. Much of this tactical information and intelligence gathering will be based upon natural human interaction with the populace. Technology, rather than replacing this human interaction, is providing new capabilities that when properly applied will greatly facilitate information collection. For example, wireless local area networks (LANs), smart cards, and shared databases can become powerful tools in developing a clear intelligence picture.

Patrols equipped with handheld or wearable computers connected to wireless LANs could provide the raw data necessary to build a substantial database of information that describes and maps the local populace. Patrols can question individuals about their residence, occupation, relations, and affiliations. Once these data are entered into the patrol's computer, it can then be transmitted via wireless LAN to a master database. From the aggregation of such open source information, tremendous amounts of intelligence could be produced. At the time of the interview, an identity card with an embedded microchip (smart card) could be produced which records the information provided. Once the populace has been provided with and required to carry such smart cards, it would be possible to run periodic checks to monitor activities and thus point out anomalies. Graphical interfaces and graphical search engines could provide commanders with powerful tools to greatly facilitate the interpretation of trends or identification of significant indicators.

In the end though, it is not the technology that matters most. While technology can greatly facilitate the recording and interpretation of information, it is the actual process of human interaction that is the essential part. As pointed out earlier, even with the most explicit information possible, the commander must possess a solid grasp of the culture and history of the area in order to make proper sense of and appreciate the significance of such information.

Unity of Command/Unity of Effort

There is enough complexity in small wars without our adding to the mix by accepting convoluted chains of command. This is one variable we must make every effort to control. It is critically important to know who's in charge and who's calling the shots. This is not to say that a clear and unambiguous chain of command can be established in every instance, but it must always be a primary objective when building the force. **The nuanced approach necessary to successfully conduct a small war requires the type of unity of effort that can only be achieved by unity of command within the military component - both regular and special operations forces**. The military component must then operate in very close cooperation and coordination with other involved agencies and allies regardless of whether a comprehensive chain of command can be established encompassing all participants.

Various entities from different countries will likely be involved, both governmental and non-governmental, but every effort must be made to develop a rational and agreed upon chain of command. This should not be construed as a desire for centralized execution. On the contrary, like fire support coordination, we need the coherence provided by centralized command, while employing decentralized execution, thereby empowering subordinates to the utmost while guiding their actions through commander's intent.

While it may be easiest to accomplish for the military component, all interagency participants must endeavor to attain unity of effort as the complex nature of small wars demands a holistic approach to avoid self-defeating actions and contradictory messages. The highly political nature of small wars demands an approach analogous to governance of a municipality. Economic development, utilities, maintenance, and security must all be balanced and effectively addressed. Failures in any one of these areas can lead to systemic failure (a phenomenon familiar to anyone who has played a SimCity-like computer game). Town and municipality management disciplines and curricula could provide useful insights and techniques for effectively coping with some of these coordination challenges.

Here again, the British experience in Malaya provides an instructive example of this imperative. In 1950, Sir Henry Briggs became the director of operations, and recognizing the need for unified command, established a War Council at the strategic level that included civil, police, and military representatives and acted as a coordinating committee.[41] Coordinating committees were also established at state and district levels. These committees provided for unity of effort by reducing duplicative operations and facilitating more rapid exchange of intelligence, thereby significantly improving operational results.[42]

While in the Malaya example Briggs was a civilian (retired general), it is possible for either a civilian or a military officer to head an interagency headquarters. A civilian head is preferable in many cases however, as this structure is the most likely to facilitate the necessary cooperation from other civilian and non-governmental entities. Also, because diplomacy remains active during a small war, the objective is to return to normal relations as quickly as possible, and this would place significant emphasis on conflict termination, a matter clearly within the civilian chain of command's purview. Such a structure would facilitate war termination negotiations and reduce the likelihood of repeating mistakes like those made at the end of the first Gulf War.

Trust is the coin of the realm when it comes to achieving unity of effort. Without trust, effective cooperation and coordination will not take place. Thus, **gaining and maintaining trust among all participants is of the first priority.**

Dynamics of the Interagency Process

Past Defense and State Department practices have made unity of command difficult. Regional Assistant Secretaries (the

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[41] Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1994), 568.

[42] Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War – Counter-Insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 57-9.

Combatant Commander's functional equivalent) have not typically been employed in actual operations, and the State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to the Combatant Commander serves only in an advisory role. While productive relations have been established between the Combatant Commander and the Assistant Secretary in specific instances, this has been based more upon the serendipity of cordial interpersonal relations between the principals rather than broader institutional or organizational mandates.

Ambassadors and embassy staffs who are on the ground are assigned to specific countries and do not have authority over the wider region. Country teams are thus not equipped to coordinate regional activities as is the theater commander. In the future, emergencies will often transcend national boundaries, and the absence of compatible organizational structures between State and Defense will become increasingly problematic. This mismatch often means that by default the Combatant Commander is in charge of complex regional contingencies even when the mission would more appropriately be headed by a civilian.

At the tactical level, a symbiotic relationship has developed between the military and NGOs. Many NGOs have come to rely on the military for logistical support and security. For its part, the military has grown to accept the presence of the NGO community as an integral element of the small wars landscape, but important distinctions will always remain despite this increasingly cooperative relationship. **One such distinction arises from the NGO inclination to maintain neutrality – not assisting or impeding either side in a conflict. The military, on the other hand, generally exercises impartiality – enforcing discipline against either side that crosses a certain line or violates established rules.** While NGOs need the military's protection to perform their missions, associating too closely with the military can, in their view, compromise their neutrality. Consequently, the two communities have different incentives for information sharing – NGOs are particularly sensitive if they feel that military forces are trying to gain information from them for military advantage. The two communities also have different time horizons – the NGOs' presence

is indefinite, whereas the military's is usually of much more limited duration.

TACTICAL PERSPECTIVES

The body of writing on the tactics, techniques, procedures, (TTPs) and lessons-learned applicable to small wars is voluminous and ever changing. Unlike 1940 when the Small Wars Manual was published, there is an extensive library of Joint and Service doctrine, TTPs, and lessons-learned.

Today's challenge is getting the right information to the right user at the right time. It is the intent of the small wars website ***http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil*** to assist in meeting this challenge. While nearly everything on the website is available in printed form, the website is designed to have a robust search capability to allow the busy operator to plug in a search query and get the required information quickly. This resource is intended to facilitate development of unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) that can be tailored to meet the immediate situation and then printed and distributed to unit leaders as required.

Ideally, unit leaders will have time during their preparatory phase to review the website and build their own reference resource prioritized upon mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops, support, and time available (METT-T) analysis before deployment. However, the real world inevitably contains surprises, and the small wars website offers a valuable tool to prepare for these unexpected contingencies by providing access to a wide array of latest small wars relevant reference material.

Counter-Insurgency

It is worth noting that much of the current counter-insurgency

material is still heavily flavored from the Cold War and Vietnam experiences. This does not invalidate the content since the great majority of the material remains valid, but as with the strategic and operational perspectives, these resources are guides, and while TTPs are inherently more prescriptive than strategic or operational planning factors, this does mean they cannot or should not be modified to meet the specifics of the situation at hand. The inherent complexity and variability of the small wars problem demands flexibility and adaptability at all levels – strategic, operational, and tactical. The ongoing Global War on Terrorism and the war in Iraq will inevitably re-invigorate the study of this topic and the resulting works will be added to the website.

Knowledge and appreciation of local cultures is especially important in counter-insurgency operations. Here again, the unclassified cultural intelligence studies produced by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity are a good starting point. These studies are available in CD-ROM and on the SIPRNET and should be exploited to the fullest.

Stability and Support Operations

The recently released FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations is an especially relevant and well-written reference on its subject, particularly in clarifying terminology (See Appendix D). The term Stability and Support Operations (SASO) is being used with increasing frequency by all Services. In the U.S. Army construct, full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. This four-part spectrum of operations is conducted in either war or MOOTW.

Urban Operations

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's **X-files** are a valuable source for TTPs and can be accessed through the Small Wars Website or directly at ***http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/x_files.asp***.

- The X-Files contain useful information packaged for rapid reading and easy transport in the cargo pocket of the utility uniform.

- They convey a synthesis of knowledge gained from experiments with tactics, techniques, and procedures, and some enabling technologies that can help us fight and win battles. Most of them focus on operations in the urban battlespace.

- They are an evolving body of knowledge that is being constantly refined through experimentation.

- Much of the information in the X-Files is entered into the Marine Corps Combat Development System. It forms the backbone of recommended revisions to Marine Corps doctrine for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).

- Knowledge in the X-Files also underpins much of the Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) program used by the Operating Forces.

- The X-Files gather, organize and synthesize knowledge from post training analysis and feedback from Marines, Sailors and other participants in the Warfighting Lab's experiments. They do not contain official doctrine, nor are they policy or standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Project Metropolis

Project Metropolis provides training to the operating forces and conducts experiments to develop new TTPs and discover new technologies. ProMet is developing an online training program to facilitate the BUST program. ProMet lessons learned will result in doctrinal revisions, training improvements, and identification of technological/materiel shortfalls.

CHAPTER 6

PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Structural Challenges

Today it is often asserted that our military is better prepared and more capable than ever before. While this is clearly valid in a general sense, it requires some qualification when discussing small wars, because in certain respects, the U.S. military may be less well suited for small wars today than it was in the early 20th century. With all the important technological and educational advances over the past century this might seem impossible; but experience, character, common sense, flexibility, creativity, and cultural awareness count more than technology in the prosecution of small wars.

Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy can be a significant structural impediment to effective preparation and conduct of small wars where maximum flexibility and creativity are essential. In mature bureaucracies, numerous checks and balances tend to breed mediocrity by excluding the colorful, the bold, or the audacious. Unfortunately, throughout history it has often been the exceptional individual that has made the difference between success and failure in small wars, and well-oiled bureaucracies tend to be intolerant of the exceptional.

Organizations populated by intelligent, capable individuals of character are best served by fostering an open learning environment where common sense and innovative actions are not just tolerated, but encouraged.

Force protection is a good example of how bureaucratic checks and balances can have unintended consequences. A logical and

important concept, and certainly not a new one, force protection has been taken to an illogical extreme in some cases by the cumulative effect of respective layers in the chain of command demanding heavy oversight and accountability in order to insulate their respective organizations from blame. This type of reflexive response can cause considerations such as force protection to become ends unto themselves and impede mission accomplishment.[43] Unfortunately, basing arrangements like Bondsteel tend to preclude the close interaction necessary for a peacekeeping force to gain legitimacy from the local populace and develop a true understanding of the local situation.

In sum, the more mature the bureaucracy, the more highly tuned its system of checks and balances, which in turn creates levels of scrutiny that diminish freedom to err and freedom to learn and inhibit innovation generally. New and "improved" rules and regulations are frequently promulgated, but seldom are old ones removed or rescinded. The cumulative effect of this piling on of regulations is the bane of developed bureaucracies.

Experience

At the beginning of the last century, the Marine Corps had fewer than 300 officers and less than 8,000 enlisted. Today, the Corps has 80 active duty general officers overseeing roughly 175,000 officers and Marines. Given the constant commitments throughout the early 20th century and the very small size of the Corps, a high percentage of officers had small wars experience.[44] In contrast, recent Marine Corps participation in small wars has been short-term, small-scale, and episodic, with experience spread across a Corps over 20 times larger than a century ago. As Chesty Puller said, "The Constabulary Detachment, where I saw it in both Haiti

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[43] Note: It is possible that in rare situations the primary mission becomes force protection, but in most situations force protection, while an important consideration, is subordinate to the primary military mission.

[44] Keith Bickel, *Mars Learning* (New York: Westview Press, 2001), 16. Roughly one-third of officers in any one year between 1915-1935 were engaged in small wars.

and Nicaragua, was the best school the Marine Corps has ever devised." In the same vein, a more recent commentator has stated that, "If, as the Duke of Wellington once claimed, the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, then it might be said with equal justice that the Pacific campaign in World War II was won in the jungles of Nicaragua."[45] As with any aphorism, a word of qualification is called for. The foregoing quote should not be interpreted to mean that the best individual small wars warriors necessarily made the best fighters in World War II, because some did not. Rather, it was the cultural, institutional warfighting ethos, and self-sufficient can-do approach which developed from involvement in small wars in the decades prior to World War II that held the Corps in such good stead when it came to preparing for and conducting the island hopping campaigns of the Pacific.

While it is certainly true that the tremendous experience our forces gained in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the continuing Global War on Terrorism provides vitally needed combat experience, today's relative deficit of practical experience can only be mitigated by vigorous education and training to ensure that the Corps' warfighting ethos and culture of adaptability are maintained. Veterans of Iraqi Freedom will be an important cadre from which our warfighting tradition is perpetuated, but training, education, and doctrine will be their tools.

Doctrine is an important complement to training and education, yet the Marine Corps traditionally has not placed heavy reliance on formal doctrine. This is largely the result of high levels of practical experience coupled with a healthy oral tradition. Given this logic, reduced levels of experience and shrinking of the oral tradition would argue for a concomitant increase in training and education and the enhanced relevance and utility of doctrine. While larger organizations, with exponentially larger bureaucracies, have increasingly come to rely upon doctrine to cope with the challenges inherent in their massive structures, the Corps has continued to

[45] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (Boulder: Basic Books, 2002), 252.

rely largely upon war stories, mentoring, and on-the-job training than upon strict doctrinal conformity.

Current assignment and deployment policies are not conducive to building the level of operational experience necessary to cope with the complexities of small wars. As mentioned earlier, the real strength of the Marine Corps has been practical experience. Marines have always learned by doing and have a rich oral history with which to perpetuate this legacy. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the early years of the last century who excelled at small wars and subsequently in the cauldrons of World War I and World War II were long-serving professionals with extensive field experience. They provided the competent and capable cadres that enabled the successful wartime expansion of the Corps.

Today, distractions from warfighting have grown precipitously, and for those fortunate enough to be involved in combat or contingency operations, the duration of this experience is usually measured in weeks rather than the months and years of the earlier era. Concurrently, as our level of experience as a percentage of the force declines, our oral history, which was largely perpetuated through social interaction in the clubs and the larger military community, is diminishing. Like the larger society from which it comes, today's officer corps is more fragmented and insular, and lacks opportunities for experiencing the oral tradition which served to educate earlier generations of Marines in the subtleties of warfare. In such an environment, education and training take on added importance.

In short, solid historical education, extensive cultural study, and rigorous training are essential correctives to the challenges presented by an increasingly bureaucratized and less culturally and socially cohesive military.

Education

Education is a critical component for successfully understanding and coping with the complexities inherent in small wars. In the

small wars of the early 20th century, the military was frequently the only show in town, and thus there was little competition for legitimacy within the theater of operations. Today, there are an ever-growing number of actors competing for attention and resources. NGOs, private volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations, private military corporations (PMCs e.g., Executive Outcomes) and the media are all involved, thus making military operations more complex and unwieldy. Without a solid educational foundation, Marines will be ill-equipped to deal with the numerous institutional and human cultures with which they will be confronted.

Cultural Studies

During the Cold War, it was possible to provide professional military education (PME) on "the threat" (e.g., Soviet Union) through formal schools and informal training programs. In the current multipolar world of numerous but non-specific threats, this is no longer so easy. The traditional approach to teaching "the threat" is now impractical since the list of possible adversaries is too numerous to focus on any one individual threat in great detail. That said, through careful review and analysis it should be possible to choose, for example, the top five threats to study and wargame against.

Ultimately, however, only through the study of history and cultural studies can we build the broad foundation necessary from which to interpret and then counter specific emergent threats. Now more than ever, information is power, and the type of information necessary for success in small wars is not the type of ephemeral information provided by sensors in a network centric grid. Rather, it is the information and understanding that can only be gleaned from human networks, and it is information that can only be successfully interpreted by a military imbued with a deep understanding of the historical and cultural context from which a specific threat emanates.

There has been tremendous attention and investment in improving immediate reporting capabilities through technical means such as the Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), but significantly less attention has been paid to building the foundational information needed to provide commanders with the contextual knowledge necessary for rapid decision-making – the second "O" in the OODA Loop (observation, **orientation**, decision, action). For example, studies have shown that emergency response personnel such as fire chiefs use recognitional decision-making. This means they have extensive personal experience in their area of expertise and when confronted with an emergency, are able to rapidly assimilate the data and make rapid decisions based upon the contextual knowledge derived from their experience base. Developing a workable CROP is very important, but we must acknowledge that only through aggressive education and training will we have leaders with the skills necessary to most efficiently and effectively use this new information tool.

History

Marines must be able to make critical decisions quickly in the face of great uncertainty. Given the many forms that warfare can take today, it is impossible for first-hand experience to provide the level of expertise necessary to make the best decisions. Given this, the study of military history must act as a surrogate for actual experience. Over 100 years ago, Mahan expressed concern about the over-emphasis the Navy was giving to scientific and engineering studies at the expense of the study of history. Mahan viewed decisive combat leadership as a more important attribute for an officer than scientific ability. He stated, "devotion to science and the production of the instruments of war, from the ship itself downward should be of certain, relatively small, classes of specialists … [and] the attempt to combine the two has upon the whole been a failure."[46]

Mahan believed there was a propensity for those schooled heavily in science and engineering "… to promote caution unduly; to

[46] Commander A.T. Mahan, "Naval Education," *Proceedings*, December 1879, 352.

substitute calculation for judgment; to create trust in formulas rather than in one's self."[47] It is with similar thoughts in mind that the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps instituted a Commandant's Reading List and charged all Marines with pursuing the study of military art and science through the study of military history. This program was yet another manifestation of the cultural shift emanating from the shocks of Beirut.

Training

The best preparation for small wars, aside from practical experience, is study and practice – training and education. Training provides for the practical application of lessons learned through historical and area education and other technical instruction. As with any performing artist, there is no substitute for performance before a live audience.[48] For the military, this translates into externally evaluated command post and field training exercises and field experimentation. To assist in training, new advances in modeling and simulation (M&S) provide staffs the ability to evaluate courses of action by simulating complex scenarios. While modeling and simulation will never provide a foolproof predictive tool, the training benefits of M&S cannot be ignored.

To be effective, training for small wars must be force-on-force with active participation by actual or simulated civilian officials, non-combatants, and aggressors. As one example, garrison settings can be used as small wars training areas at little or no cost. While in garrison, Marines could participate in ongoing training activities where role players "visit" the command post (CP) as part of a scenario that simulates conditions the unit would confront if it were deployed for a small wars mission. Various units throughout the base could be assigned roles thereby simulating a potential threat country or region within our existing bases. Given the large political,

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[47] Ibid., 347.

[48] Jon Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), xiii.

civil, and economic aspects of small wars, much practical training could be done in this way without leaving home. Scenario-based garrison training conducted by a dedicated opposition force (OPFOR) would greatly assist in unit preparation for small wars.

A prevalent part of small wars discussion during the 1990s centered around whether small wars, or MOOTW, should be prepared for as a lesser included case of conventional warfare. Upon examination, the real focus of this discussion was on training priorities. Did the military require specialized training in order to properly conduct MOOTW? While some tasks are obviously more important in MOOTW or small wars than in large-scale conventional warfare, such as crowd control or humanitarian operations, the tactics involved are largely the same, giving credence to the argument that MOOTW operations can be adequately prepared for by rigorously training for conventional operations. However, this only applies for TTPs. As discussed in the introduction, for operational and strategic level considerations, small wars are distinctly different from conventional operations, thus making the "lesser included case" argument invalid beyond the set of tactical training, techniques, and procedures relevant to both forms of warfare. The key point here is that forces trained and equipped for conventional operations can successfully perform small wars missions even though they are not optimized for them, as long as their leaders are schooled in the requisite small wars skills

Organization

Flexible task organization of combined arms teams is essential for small wars. The best construct for today's strategic environment is highly responsive standing combined arms forces that only require tailoring on the margins when a specific mission is assigned. This is necessary for two reasons: to ensure necessary proficiency and unit cohesion in complex tasks and to enable sufficiently rapid force generation and deployment.

Teamwork and implicit understanding will be critical for success on the small war battlefield. Units must be organized in garrison as

they are envisioned to fight. Because specific missions will often require certain specialized capabilities not organic to the assigned unit, modular task organization (plug and play mission focused standing units, e.g., Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)) could be used to effectively tailor standing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) with the minimum disruption to unit cohesion and readiness. Modular Task Organization provides the ability to tailor standing organizations with well-trained, cohesive, mission-oriented force packages (modules), thereby providing specialized capabilities lacking or present in insufficient quantity in the larger standing MAGTF. In an increasingly complex world, specialization is essential to meet new and sophisticated threats (e.g., information warfare), but it is imperative that these specializations not come at the expense of the inherent flexibility and overall general-purpose capabilities required of the larger force to cope with the broad range of possible threats.

The most relevant forces for future small wars must be prepared to respond on shorter timelines than in the past. As a very general rule, units should be roughly 80 to 90 percent task organized for the most likely missions in their area of responsibility. Then when the alert order is received, only fine-tailoring employing Modular Task Organization is required to address specialized requirements and fully optimize the force for the specific mission.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this work should be but the end of the beginning of a continuing study of small wars. This slim volume is obviously not intended to be the definitive word on the subject. It is hoped that it will stimulate additional examination and reflection on the complex phenomenon of small wars. The art of successfully conducting small wars cannot be learned from a manual, but rather requires a lifetime of reading, thinking, and doing. We must study history, the cultures of the world, and our military profession, for with our long legacy of small wars we have no excuse, when fighting them, for not fighting them well.[49]

[49] Garnett, 768-9.

APPENDIX A

TYPES OF SMALL WARS OPERATIONS

A review of doctrinal terms related to low-intensity conflict, MOOTW, and stability/peace operations reveals considerable overlap, and some ambiguity, as to what constitutes small wars operations/missions. The alphabetical listing below provides an overview of operational terms, and their doctrinal definitions (derived from JP 1-02 unless otherwise referenced), which is consistent with the scope of small wars and small wars-related missions as discussed in this paper.

Arms Control Activities: Actions conducted in compliance with or in support of arms control treaties, agreements, obligations, or ongoing negotiations.[50]

Combating Terrorism (CBT): Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Consequence Management (CM): Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests

[50] This definition was derived from CJCSM 3113.01A, A-14, GL-2.

with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as directed.[51]

Counterproliferation: The activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. Government efforts to combat proliferation, including the application of military power to protect US forces and interests; intelligence collection and analysis; and support to diplomacy, arms control and export controls; with particular responsibility for ensuring U.S. forces and interests can be protected, should they confront an adversary armed with WMD or missile delivery systems.[52]

DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations: Support provided by the Department of Defense to drug law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.

Foreign Consequence Management: Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) situation within the territory of a foreign country in support of host nation authorities.[53]

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA): Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. It is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or

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[51] This definition was slightly modified form JP 1-02, for use in Joint Capstone Concept, *Full Spectrum Dominance Through Joint Integration*, draft version 3.0, 9 December 2002, 62.

[52] CJCSI 5113.01A – Counterproliferation Charter, referenced in JCC ver. 3.0, 64.

[53] JP 1-02 & JCC ver. 3.0, 63.

agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the U.S., its territories, and possessions.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Freedom of Navigation Operations: Operations conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air and sea routes.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, U.S. Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

Information Operations (IO): Actions taken to shape the environment, affect adversary information and information systems, and defend one's own information and information systems.

Military Contacts: Visits by military and defense personnel, delegations, and units to foreign countries for the purpose of security cooperation. Military contacts include senior defense official and senior officer visits, counterpart visits, ship port visits, participation in defense shows and demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, regional conferences, State Partnership for Peace Program activities, attaché activities and personnel and unit exchange programs.[54]

[54] JP 1-02 & JCC ver. 3.0, GL-6.

Multinational Education: The education of personnel in the defense related institutional activities and programs of another nation.[55]

Multinational Exercise: A military maneuver or simulated operation conducted with military forces from two or more nations for the purpose of training and evaluation.[56]

Multinational Training: Unit and individual training activities conducted with military forces from two or more nations.[57]

Nation Assistance: Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 1- (DoD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States.

Normal & Routine Military Activities: The normal operations and broad day-to-day activities that a combatant command, military service or defense agency performs pursuant to its statutory and regulatory functions and responsibilities.[58]

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[55] Ibid.

[56] JP 1-02 & JCC ver. 3.0, GL-3.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Definition derived from JCC ver. 3.0, p. 68, modified from JP 1-02.

Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO): Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike peacekeeping operations, PEO do not require the consent of all parties. They normally include one or more of the following subordinate missions: forcible separation of belligerents; establishment and supervision of protected areas; sanction and exclusion zone enforcement; movement denial and guarantee; restoration/maintenance of order; protection of humanitarian assistance.[59]

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. They usually involve observing, monitoring, or supervising and assisting parties to a dispute.[60]

Peace Operations (PO): The set of military operations that encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). See the PKO and PEO definitions in this appendix for further reference.[61]

Recovery Operations: Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

Sanction Enforcement Operations: Operations that employ coercive measures in support of national or international policy to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.[62]

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[59] JP 1-02, modified with reference to definition in FM 3-0, Operations.

[60] Ibid.

[61] FM 3-0, Chapter 9, Stability Operations.

[62] JP 1-02 & JCC ver. 3.0, 64.

Security Assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security Cooperation Activities: Planned military activities chiefly involving interaction with foreign military and civilian personnel, to help create a favorable imbalance of military power, expand the range of pre-conflict options available to deter or favorably prosecute armed conflict, or otherwise favorably influence the security environment.[63]

Show of Force: An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives. Shows of force are typically used to bolster and reassure allies, to deter potential aggressors, and to gain or increase influence in a region.[64]

Support to Counterinsurgency: Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency.

Support to Insurgency. Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

Unconventional Warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an

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[63] This definition was derived from the 30 August 2001 Defense Planning Guidance at an unclassified level, and referred to in the JCC ver. 3.0, 66.

[64] This definition was derived from the 30 August 2001 Defense Planning Guidance at an unclassified level, and referred to in the JCC ver. 3.0, 66.

external force. It includes guerilla warfare and other direct offensive low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

INTERAGENCY POLICY FOR COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATONS

References:
PDD-25, Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (May 1994)
PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations (May 1997)
PDD-56, Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations (13 AUG, 1998)

Lessons learned from the U.S. intervention in Somalia resulted in an executive order to review U.S. peacekeeping policies and programs and to develop a comprehensive framework for U.S. involvement in such future operations. The outcome of this effort was the establishment of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) on *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, signed by President Clinton in May 1994. PDD-25 addressed six major issues where reforms were deemed necessary: (1) selectivity of peace operations in which the U.S. and UN decide to intervene; (2) reduction of U.S. and UN costs for such operations; (3) clarity of guidance on command vice operational control over U.S. forces by foreign commanders; (4) strengthening of UN capabilities to perform peace operations; (5) delineation of what agency (DoD or State Department) is responsible for management and funding of peace operations based on whether combat units are involved; and (6) increased cooperation and information flow between the Executive Branch and Congress.

The experiences of Somalia and the resultant guidelines established in PDD-25 weighed on participants in the planning process that began in mid-1994 for operations in Haiti. The NSC Deputies Committee established an Executive Committee (ExCom) at the assistant secretary level, charged with developing policy

options and plans for a U.S. intervention. The ExCom developed a political-military plan (the first of its kind) that articulated the objectives of the mission, an interagency strategy to meet those objectives, and divisions of labor amongst the various agencies involved.[65] In an effort to institutionalize the progress made in interagency planning for Haiti, PDD-56 on *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* was established and signed by President Clinton in May 1997. The term "complex contingency operations" was used to reflect the multi-dimensional responses required by these situations, demanding actions and resources from political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, humanitarian, and security components. PDD-56 outlined the following guidelines for such contingency operations:

- The NSC Deputies Committee will establish an interagency ExCom to facilitate policy planning and execution of complex contingency operations.
- A political-military plan ("pol-mil plan") will be developed to drive policy implementation by coordinating the actions of all agencies involved.
- An interagency rehearsal will be conducted prior to execution of an operation to review the pol-mil plan's main efforts, as well as to synchronize/de-conflict agencies' actions and identify any gaps in the planning process.
- An after-action review will be conducted for each operation.
- Interagency training will be established to support this process.[66]

Subsequent to PDD-56 being issued, the NSC produced a *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* in August 1998. The intent of this handbook was to further institutionalize the mechanisms of the interagency process mandated in PDD-56, and was designed to provide standardized education/

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[65] Michele Flournoy, "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction," draft white paper for the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, 2002, 2.

[66] Ibid., 2.

training/planning tools and coordination mechanisms to assist both civilian and military officials in their management responsibilities for these operations.

The institutionalization of the interagency process as directed in PDD-56 has not been fully implemented, though several of its initiatives were incorporated into subsequent pol-mil planning efforts. After the Bush Administration came into office, the National Security Council staff drafted a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) designed to broaden the scope of PDD-56. The NSPD develops guidance on providing warning, advanced planning, prevention, and response options for complex contingency operations.[67] However, as of the date of this publication, the President has yet to sign this NSPD, and the Administration pursued a largely ad hoc response to pol-mil planning in Afghanistan.

[67] *Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), January 2003, 10.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS/ CIVIL AFFAIRS

Reference: JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (8 Feb, 2001)

This publication provides guidance for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, and for the use of civil affairs and other related assets in the execution of CMO. It is the doctrinal basis for U.S. military involvement in multinational and interagency operations, and is aimed to assist the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.

CMO encompass the activities that joint force commanders (JFCs) conduct to establish and maintain positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities, and the general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral or hostile areas. The objective of CMO is to minimize interference from the civilian population in military operations, and when possible, reduce military interference with the civilian populace. Civil affairs personnel bridge the gap between the military and civilian environments in fulfilling these objectives. To maintain effective civil-military relations, JFCs (typically through the use of civil affairs assets) must maintain interaction between United States, multinational, and indigenous security forces, as well as government and non-government organizations. There are multiple types of CMO in a small wars environment for which JFCs may be responsible for conducting *foreign humanitarian assistance* due to natural or manmade disasters; *assistance to host nation governments* or de facto authorities in retaining control of their populations and resources; *nation assistance operations* in peace or war, mandated by agreements between the U.S. and that

nation; *military civic action*, involving the provision of advice, supervision, or technical support to facilitate the winning of a local population's support for a foreign nation and its military; *emergency services* to minimize the impacts of disasters (to include restoration of vital utilities and facilities); and facilitation of activities that reinforce or restore a *civil administration* that supports U.S. objectives.

The organization, command relationships, and resourcing of assets and personnel for the conduct of CMO are highly variable. JP 3-57 holds that while psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) units typically handle CMO, every U.S. military organization has some capacity to perform them (e.g. through engineer, health service, transportation, and military police assets). JFCs may consolidate CMO assets under one subordinate JTF, through a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or through a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Service, Department, or Agency supporting the theater campaign. A JSOTF is typically comprised of elements from the theater special operations command (SOC), or from an existing special operations forces (SOF) unit with augmentation from the Services' SOF units.

JP 3-57 asserts that it is the responsibility of JFCs to plan and conduct CMO given their ability to shape the battlespace and enhance the transition to civilian control. In short, CMO facilitates accomplishment of campaign objectives. CMO planning must be based on national policy and reflect the legal obligations and constraints stipulated in the U.S. Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, presidential directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law (JP 3-57 specifically recognizes the mandate for interagency coordination established in PDD-56). Planning must also address appropriate force protection measures in CMO, and it must establish clearly identifiable end state and transition criteria for an operation. While the JFC may establish staff planning for CMO within the operations directorate, as part of a distinct CMO staff element, or as an element of his personal staff, the complex nature and importance of CMO normally requires the direction and oversight of a full-time staff.

Interagency coordination between the military, economic, political, diplomatic, information, and non-governmental entities is a top priority for achieving unity of effort in CMO. At the operational level, the State Department assigns a political advisor (POLAD) or foreign policy advisor (FPA) to the geographic combatant commands to provide diplomatic support and informal linkages with embassies in the area of responsibility. The ambassador of the country in which a CMO is conducted is the Chief of Mission, holding overall responsibility for non-military U.S. government elements in that country. The various agencies overseen by that ambassador form a Country Team that provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the field.

The organization for interagency involvement in CMO can take several forms. A humanitarian operations center (HOC) may be formed as an international coordinating body to achieve unity of effort (but not to impose command and control) among the various participants in foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The UN may establish an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC) to support the information dissemination from the HOC. In humanitarian assistance operations, the combatant commander may organize a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) to provide the critical interagency link between the command and other U.S. government, non-governmental, and international agencies at the strategic level. A JFC may establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as an ad hoc organization to assist in the coordination of activities between engaged military forces and the other participants previously mentioned. Finally, a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) organization – reflecting NATO's broad approach to security – may be established with distinctly separate planning staff and operations elements.

Reference: MCWP 3-33.1, *MAGTF Civil-Military Operations*

This publication is consistent with joint guidance on CMO, builds on the principles established in MCDP 1 (*Warfighting*), and specifically addresses the MAGTF application of CMO. CMO

supports the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission by acting as an economy of force measure in aiding the commander to shape the battlespace, or by reducing friction with the civilian populace that may disrupt MAGTF operations.

MAGTF CMO planners must create an information system that supports follow-on employment of dedicated CA assets. Given the short-fused nature of many contingency operations, development of pre-planned, pre-packaged, on-call CMO support may be necessary to ensure responsiveness. Also, the MAGTF must comply with CMO policy guidance that will likely be established outside of the MAGTF.

The MAGTF will often be the first U.S. force to interact with the populace and so must be prepared to enhance cooperation with the civilian populace to mitigate problems that would otherwise divert resources from its operational objectives. Planning considerations for such interaction must account for the ethnic, racial, political, economic, and linguistic diversity of the populace. In particular, Marines in CMO must aim to effectively communicate with the most influential leaders of the population in the hopes they can positively influence opinions and actions. Indigenous leadership may take many forms: governmental/political; religious; ethnic; grassroots/opinion leaders; public safety and public health officials; and public administrators. In communicating with the indigenous leaders and population, Marines conducting CMO must always consider four key questions:

- What will the civilians do?
- What do we want them to do?
- How can the MAGTF encourage this to happen?
- What does the MAGTF need to know in order to make this happen?

Marines will also likely be the first forces to interact with personnel from other government agencies on the ground in a CMO. Those they are most likely to meet include: American Embassy (AMEMB); Department of State (DOS); U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID); and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Also, the MAGTF will likely encounter international and non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs) that are part of the CMO's relief operations; a good relationship between them and the MAGTF is mutually beneficial.

The MAGTF's CMO objectives include: (1) reducing civilian interference; (2) supporting and implementing U.S. national policies; (3) fulfilling the commander's legal and moral responsibilities; (4) the legal acquisition of civilian resources in support of military operations; (5) re-establishing civil governing capability; and (6) avoiding damage to property and usable resources.

The MAGTF does not maintain organic active civil affairs (CA) units. However, with augmentation from the Reserve's two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), the MAGTF has the capability to plan and conduct CA activities in contingency, crisis, and assistance operations. Once activated, the CAGs (located in Camp Pendleton, CA and Anacostia, Washington, DC) are capable of self-administration but require support from the MAGTF command element to coordinate logistics support. The Legal Service Support Section within the Fleet Service Support Group can provide a limited, interim CA planning capability prior to the activation of the CAG. The CAG can provide CA support to a MEF; a CA Detachment supports the MEU or a Major Subordinate Command of the MEF. The CAGs and Detachments have broad capability in nine functional areas: dislocated civilians; cultural relations; public safety; civilian supply; civil information; legal; public health; public works/utilities and public communications (these two functions are considered more limited capabilities).

Establishing Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) can be an invaluable resource for the MAGTF in CMO. The CMOC is the focal point for coordination and planning between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations, though it is not where the CA element plans MAGTF CMO. A CMOC does not give direction to the MAGTF, but rather relays information and recommendations. More than one CMOC can be established in an

area of operations; logistically, it may require nothing more than the interior of a tactical vehicle. CA personnel provide the primary interface between a MAGTF's CMOC and other non-military organizations.

Other Useful CMO/CA Doctrinal References:

DoD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*
JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*
FMFM 7-34, *MAGTF Civil Affairs* (11 JUL, 1991)
FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*
FM 3-05.401 / MCWP 3-33.1A, *Civil Affairs TTR*

MOOTW / STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Reference: JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*

JP 3-07 explains how "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) differ from large-scale, sustained combat operations:

> *"MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player. More restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed."*[68]

The terms small wars and MOOTW are not synonymous, although MOOTW tends to predominate in small wars. But as stated above, Vietnam can be classified a small war due to the political and diplomatic context under which it was fought, and while it had significant MOOTW components, it would be inaccurate to classify it strictly as a MOOTW. Small wars can be war or MOOTW. Thus, "small war" is a broader term than MOOTW.

Political objectives drive MOOTW, and JP 3-07 emphasizes the resultant necessity of U.S. forces to understand the potential impact of "inappropriate actions" in that political context, as well as to be aware of shifting political objectives that may warrant a change in

[68] Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995, vii.

military operations.[69] To this end, MOOTW are enabled by the overseas presence of U.S. forces to deter war, and by their capacity to conduct crisis response. Thus, MOOTW emphasize peacetime engagements in both non-permissive and permissive environments that exist below the threshold of armed conflict. Examples of MOOTW operations in non-permissive environments include: strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, insurgency and counterinsurgency support, ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight, evacuation of non-combatants, and demonstrations of force. Examples of MOOTW operations in permissive environments include: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, national assistance, foreign internal defense, support to counter-drug operations, arms control, shipping protection, recovery operations, military support to civil authorities, and peacekeeping.

There are six guiding principles of MOOTW, derived from warfighting doctrine:

- Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective;
- Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose;
- Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage;
- Restraint may be required in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently.
- Perseverance allows for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims;
- Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, where applicable.[70]

Planning considerations or functions for MOOTW in many ways parallel planning for war, though there are some unique

[69] Ibid., vii.

[70] Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995, viii.

characteristics of those functions in a peacetime environment. These considerations include:

- Careful mission analysis of all potential threats, enabled by multi-disciplined and multi-sourced intelligence and information gathering.
- A mix of forces sufficient for transition to combat operations if necessary.
- Unit integrity that enables quick deployment and sustained operations.
- Increased liaison planning for multinational operations.
- Flexible command and control to promote unity of effort.
- Effective utilization of combat multipliers, some of which may not be accessible in active component forces:
    - Civil affairs to provide assessments of civil infrastructure, assist in operating temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between military and outside entities.
    - Psychological operations to provide a planned, systematic process of conveying messages and influencing selected target groups.
    - Public affairs, to include media reporting, to influence public opinion.
    - NGOs/PVOs and interagency support for better situational awareness.
- Appreciation of unique legal issues.
- Importance of logistics, which may even precede combat forces in deployment.
- Sufficient planning for transition from wartime operations to MOOTW, and for actions inherent in termination of MOOTW (transition to civil authority, marking/clearing of minefields, closure of financial obligations, etc.).

Reference: FM 3-0, *Operations: CH 9, Stability Operations* (14 JUN, 2001)

Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests through both developmental, cooperative activities during peacetime

and coercive actions in response to crisis. The objectives of peacetime military engagements (PMEs) are to open communications, increase interoperability, foster regional military professionalism, and demonstrate by example the role of the military in a democracy.[71] In crisis response situations, a critical factor for stability operations is a rapid response capability through prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a contingency, which can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later.

There are several commonly recurring characteristics or themes of stability operations. They are normally nonlinear and often conducted in noncontiguous areas of operation, and are often time and manpower intensive.[72] The application of METT-T factors (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time) is typically more ambiguous than would be the case in typical offensive and defensive operations. The "enemy" may be a set of elusive threats and potential adversaries; "key terrain" may be based more on political and social considerations than on physical features of the landscape; troops assigned to the commander will likely include nontraditional assets such as host nation police units, contracted interpreters, or multinational forces; and temporal considerations involve perseverance and a long-term commitment to solving the real problem. The complexity of stability operations places significant demands on small unit leaders who are required to develop interpersonal skills – such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases – while still maintaining warfighting skills. They require that small unit leaders possess the mental and physical agility to shift from non-combat to combat operations and back again.[73]

Stability operations include peace operations, operations in support of diplomatic efforts (including shows of force), foreign internal defense operations, humanitarian and civic assistance,

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[71] FM 3-0, *Operations*, Chapter 9, "Stability Operations," 3.

[72] Ibid., 4.

[73] Ibid., 5.

support to insurgencies (on order of the President and Secretary of Defense), support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, and noncombatant evacuation operations (refer to Appendix D of this paper for definitions of these and other small wars-related operational terms).

Of particular importance are the considerations discussed regarding foreign internal defense (FID) and counter-insurgency operations. U.S. forces conduct FID within the context of the U.S. ambassador's country plan and the host nation's internal defense strategy, the goal being to integrate all resources – civilian, military, public, and private – such that host nation combat operations and development efforts complement one another. Support to counterinsurgency efforts helps host governments deal with two principal groups: the insurgents and the people. FID activities help the host government protect the people from insurgent violence and separate them from insurgent control. FM 3-0 makes clear that U.S. military power cannot ensure the survival of regimes that fail to meet their people's basic needs.[74] Support to a counterinsurgency must balance security with economic development to eliminate the causes of insurgencies and encourage the insurgents to rejoin civil society. The cause of insurgent activities is widespread dissatisfaction with standing ethnic, religious, political, social, or economic conditions by a significant portion of the population. For U.S. military power to be effective in FID, the host government must address its policies toward the disaffected portions of the population.

Finally, below are some universal considerations commanders must account for in developing tailored concepts and schemes for stability operations:

- Leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation;
- Enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation;
- Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions;

[74] FM 3-0, *Operations*, Chapter 9, "Stability Operations," 9.

- Display the capability to use force in a non-threatening manner;
- Apply force selectively and discriminately.[75]

Reference: FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (FEB, 2003)

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Opperations*, amplifies and expands upon FM 3-0 (Chapters 9 and 10). Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war; stability and support operations predominate in MOOTW. FM 3-07 asserts that the very characteristics that make the U.S. Army an effective warfighting organization also serve it well in conducting stability and support operations.[76] It also recognizes that a clear trend points to greater demands placed on the military to conduct such operations in the 21st century.

Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. *Support Operations* employ forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and to relieve suffering. The primary role of support operations (comprised of domestic and foreign humanitarian assistance) is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks without military assistance. Both types of operations are relevant to small wars because they are sensitive to political considerations, and often have more restrictive rules of engagement than offensive and defensive operations. The military objectives in both types of operations associate more directly with political objectives than is

[75] FM 3-0, 14.

[76] FM 3-07, 1-1.

the case in offensive and defensive operations. Consistent with the characteristics of small wars, political authorities do not relinquish active participation in stability and support operations, and continue to exert considerable influence on the daily execution of the military campaign.[77] Also, military leaders must exercise considerable restraint in such operations. The amount of force applied to attain an intermediate objective must be appropriate to the strategic aim.

Stability operations may complement and reinforce offensive, defensive, and support operations, or they may comprise the decisive operation themselves. They fall into ten broad categories that are neither discrete nor mutually exclusive:

- Peace Operations (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and operations in support of diplomatic efforts)
- Foreign Internal Defense (indirect or direct support and combat operations)
- Security Assistance
- Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
- Support to Insurgencies (unconventional warfare and conventional combat operations)
- Support to Counterdrug Operations (detection and monitoring; host-nation support; C4; intelligence, planning, CSS, training, and manpower support; and reconnaissance)
- Combating Terrorism (antiterrorism and counterterrorism)
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Arms Control (inspection, protection, and destruction)
- Show of Force (increased force visibility, and exercises and demonstrations)

Support operations most often complement offensive, defensive, and stability operations. They are generally conducted to assist civilian authorities in response to emergencies or specified illegal activities, and to relieve or reduce suffering. Types of support operations include:

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[77] FM 3-07, 1-19.

- Relief Operations
- Support to WMD Incidents
- Support to Civil Law Enforcement
- Community Assistance

Several general considerations should guide the planning and execution of support operations. First, it is necessary to provide essential support to the largest number of people. This may require the completion of a seemingly low-priority task to accomplish a higher-priority task (e.g. restoring limited electrical services to power hospital emergency rooms and shelters). Second, forces on the ground must coordinate their actions with other agencies (particularly international relief agencies). The military will often be in support of another lead agency. Third, the establishment of measures of effectiveness, or objective standards for determining progress toward the end state, is critical to effective mission handover and must focus on the conditions of those supported. For example, the rate of decline in the mortality rate more accurately denotes success than the amount of food delivered. Finally, handover to civilian agencies should be conducted as soon as is feasible.

FM 3-07 places great emphasis on the complexities of stability and support operations, and it recognizes the need for extensive coordination to overcome those complexities. It discusses fundamental elements of instability in environments where stability and support operations typically occur, to include: balance of power issues, nationalism, clashes of culture, demographics, ungovernability, environmental risks, and propaganda. In keeping with the intent of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56; refer to Appendix B), it recognizes the need for the military to simultaneously address the political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and security components of an intervention through joint, interagency, and multinational efforts. This integration must occur without duplicating effort and working at cross-purpose. It encourages units to achieve unity of effort, even when unity of command does not exist. It also recognizes that shifting from offensive/defensive operations to stability/support operations often

requires both a mental adjustment by the unit and increased proficiency in unfamiliar tasks and missions.

Because of the complexities involved in stability and support operations, all military personnel are encouraged to understand the potential impact of inappropriate actions, and the political objectives of all involved entities. Stability and support operations require a modified understanding of what constitutes the adversary. There is a distinct danger of making enemies where they did not exist before. Peacekeeping forces must therefore resist the natural inclination to designate antagonists, or those who fail to comply with an agreement or accord, as "the enemy." FM 3-07 highlights several other considerations that address the complexity of these operations, to include:

- Mission creep, either from shifting missions types for which the unit is not prepared, or from a unit exceeding its mandate in a given mission;
- Presence of noncombatants;
- Demands of coordination with NGOs;
- Need for effective employment of IO to master the magnifying environment of these operations in which media operate;
- Operational constraints such as force caps, restricted activities and areas, and specific ROE;
- Need for adjustments in attitudes and sensitivities within units to accommodate different cultures and to establish working relationships with indigenous groups.

Stability and support operations are comprised of three subsets: shaping operations, decisive operations, and sustaining operations. Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation, and aim to convert temporary gains into long-term political success. In stability operations, they often address typical flashpoints in conflicts, such as: disarmament of combatants, repatriation of refugees, resettlement, elections, recovery of remains, resource distribution, and prevention of retribution. In conducting shaping operations, commanders must consider local law and

customs and avoid favoring a particular group or faction. Shaping in support operations may include influencing perceptions, ideas, and information and maintaining legitimacy through information operations. Decisive operations directly accomplish an assigned task, but may not always have immediately visible impacts. This may include disarming belligerents in a conflict or assisting in the conduct of an election. Finally, sustaining operations are those at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. This often includes protecting lines of communication between bases and actions taken in concert with local authorities to protect local sources of essential supplies and services.

Other Useful Doctrinal References on MOOTW/ LIC/ Peace Operations:

FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (5 DEC, 1990)
FMFRP 7-81 & FM 7-98, *Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (19 OCT, 1992)
FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (30 DEC, 1994)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Derived from planning considerations recommended in MCDP 1-0, Operations, the following list is worthy of consideration for anyone involved in small wars.

- Focus on the mission
- Maintain alignment of military and political objectives
- Coordinate political, military, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and interested parties
- Restore key economic and political institutions as a top priority
- Avoid alienating any group
- Seek unity of effort and unity of command
- Personalities more important than processes
- Maintain impartiality rather than neutrality
- Centralize information management

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Reference: JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (9 OCT 1998)
FM 100-6, Information Operations, (27 August 1996)

JP 3-13 defines information operations (IO) as involving actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own information assets.[78] More specifically, IO is a US initiative "to develop a set of doctrinal approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and operationalize the power of information."[79] The objective in targeting information is to affect the information-based process of the adversary, whether human or automated, and to target the adversary decision-maker through coercion to do or not do a certain action. Intelligence support is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of IO and is most often achieved through intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

The most critical concept to remember about IO is that it is not a weapon per se, but rather a process and a new way of thinking about relationships between organizations that control information.[80] It is an enabler and combat multiplier that enhances the commander's ability to shape the operational environment. The importance of information in small wars is ever increasing because, unlike kinetic effects (firepower), information is fungible and can be translated

[78] JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Oct 9, 1998, vii.

[79] Dr. Dan Kuehl, "Information Operations: *The Hard Reality of Soft Power*," National Defense University, September 2001, 11.

[80] Kuehl., 6.

into power without reverting to overt force.[81] The true power of IO was demonstrated in Somalia, where General Aideed effectively used the mass media to his advantage to control the flow of events.[82] From that small war, "the use of information to level the effects of power was instantly recognized and has since been established in doctrine."[83] However, IO is still not fully understood, and is often perceived as nothing more than computer warfare. IO is an umbrella term that attempts to use different facets of numerous traditional capabilities, such as deception, electronic warfare, and psychological operations to shape and influence the information environment.[84] Treated initially as a conceptual sub-component of Joint Vision 2010, Joint Vision 2020 addresses the need for dominance of IO as an integral element for success in future US military engagements. Lessons learned from Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo taught the US military the value of using information correctly and early to control conflict escalation and outcome.[85] Offensive IO involves the integrated use of capabilities and related activities, supported by intelligence, to target the observations, orientation, and perceptions of the human decision-maker (typically the adversarial commander). Included among these capabilities are: operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO). Activities related to offensive IO include Civil Affairs (CA) and Public Affairs (PA), often conducted in the pre-hostilities phase of a potential conflict. Offensive IO can often have the greatest impact in the earliest stages of a crisis where the goal is conflict avoidance. Thus, offensive IO could be conducted in MOOTW not involving the use of force. For example, computer attack could be employed to disrupt a drug cartel's communications or PSYOP's could be employed against an adversary's potential allies to sever external sources of support (military, political, or economic).

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[81] Ibid., 10.

[82] Ibid., 11.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid., 12.

Whether used before or during conflict, offensive IO must be thoroughly integrated with all non-DoD entities in the interagency process. Regionally, the relationship between the Ambassador or Country Team and the combatant commander is the most essential element of this integration in ensuring successful offensive IO.[86]

Defensive IO integrates and coordinates policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems. Defensive IO includes: information assurance, OPSEC, physical security, counter-deception, counter-propaganda, counterintelligence, Electronic Warfare, and SIO. There are two main goals in defensive IO: (1) minimize friendly IO system vulnerabilities to adversary efforts, and (2) minimize friendly mutual interference during the operational employment of IO capabilities.[87] This latter goal translates to protecting oneself from oneself by de-conflicting the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.[88] Defensive IO involves four processes: protecting one's information environment (vetting information coming into one's system for validity), detecting when and where one's organization is under attack, restoring operations (which involves both redundancy in one's system and not letting the adversary know that one's system is being affected), and responding.

JFCs should consider establishing a fully functional IO cell. The organizational structure to plan and coordinate IO should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a variety of planning and operational circumstances. IO planning is integral in both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. It must be broad-based and encompass all available elements of power - joint, service, interagency, and multinational.

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[86] Ibid., 63.

[87] Ibid., 41.

[88] Ibid.

It is important to remember that while CA and PA activities can support IO, not every CA or PA activity must necessarily be tied to IO. Additionally, a good IO plan will likely only incorporate a select few of the capabilities and activities at the disposal of planners.[89]

[89] Ibid., 13.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Reference: JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (10 JUL 1996)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is the art of influencing the attitudes, feelings, emotions, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. It involves operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences, and can serve as both a combat multiplier and a combat reducer. It can help magnify the impact of combat operations, for example, by convincing enemy forces that defeat is inevitable. It can also help reduce the incidence of combat and save lives. It can be used to convince enemy soldiers to put down their weapons. As Major General Wilhelm, the commander of US Marine Forces during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, explained, "the PSYOP loudspeaker teams were a combat subtractor … they reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."[90] PSYOP gives military commanders the capability to communicate directly with the civilian population, providing the people with needed information and articulating the United States' side of the story to gain indigenous support.

In planning PSYOP, several basic elements must be present: a clearly defined mission; analysis of all targets; the evaluation of actions for psychological implications; a reliable medium or media

[90] *Psychological Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope*, United Task Force Somalia, May 4, 1993, 6.

for transmission; rapid exploitation of PSYOP themes;[91] and continued assessment of the results of PSYOP for their relevance to the mission. When integrated into the joint force commander's overall campaign plan, PSYOP can help accomplish the mission by magnifying the impact of the many different things the command is saying and doing. Designed and tailored for a specific target audience, psychological operations must relate to the situation at hand, be used in a timely manner; be projected through the most appropriate media forms, and use the appropriate language. The delivery of messages through PSYOP can take numerous forms: face to face communications, loudspeaker broadcasts, radio and television broadcasts, printed materials such as leaflets, posters, booklets, comic books, and newspapers, and modern technology such as cell-phones and e-mails via internet.

There are three PYSOP objectives most relevant to small wars: reducing the efficiency of opposing forces, facilitating reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations, and supporting/enhancing humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and/or foreign national assistance military operations. Virtually all other MOOTW missions can be supported by joint PSYOP such as unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, peace operations, and civil affairs.

Relevant considerations in how PSYOP can support traditional Special Operations Forces missions in a small wars environment are discussed below. These missions (particularly unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism) are highlighted because the Marine Corps may play an increased role in their conduct, particularly as US Special Operations Command increasingly focuses more of its resources on fighting the Global War on Terrorism.

[91] It is essential that all PSYOP products (such as leaflets or radio scripts) use the same themes and symbols, necessitating a single product center. (JP 3-53, vii.).

Unconventional Warfare, UW (Refer to Appendix A for definition). PSYOP incorporate four major types of UW targets:

- The uncommitted.
- Hostile sympathizers.
- Hostile military forces.
- Resistance sympathizers.[92]

Foreign Internal Defense, FID (Refer to Appendix A for definition). Specific PSYOP goals exist for FID missions that target particular groups:

- Creating dissension, low morale, and subversion within *insurgent forces*.
- Gaining *civilian support* for the host nation (HN) government and projecting a favorable image of the US.
- Building and maintaining the morale of HN *military forces*.
- Gaining support of *neutral elements* (uncommitted groups).
- Convincing *external hostile powers* that insurgency will fail.

Counterterrorism, CT (Refer to Appendix A for definition). The aim of PSYOP in CT operations is to place the terrorist forces on the psychological defensive. This is done through the following means:

- Countering the adverse effects of a terrorist act.
- Lessening popular support for the terrorist cause.
- Publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups.
- Persuading the terrorists that they cannot achieve their goals and that they are at personal risk.[93]

Civil-Military Operations / Civil Affairs CA (Refer to Appendix C for definitions). PSYOP can provide key support and information

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[92] JP 3-53, V-5.

[93] JP 3-53, V-7.

for CA activities, when effectively integrated into civil-military operations, in the following ways:

- Developing information for CA concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area.
- Disseminating information concerning the safety and welfare of the indigenous population.
- Influencing a civilian population's attitude towards US policy and preparing it for CA involvement in post-conflict activities.
- Maximizing CA efforts in humanitarian assistance operations by exploiting the goodwill created by US efforts in the areas of medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities.
- Providing direct support to CA units conducting emergency relocation operations of displaced civilians and for operation of the displaced civilian camps.[94]

Other missions more relevant to the Marine Corps' current employment of PSYOP include: humanitarian assistance operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, and consequence management (refer to Appendix A for definitions). Because the Marine Corps does not have its own PSYOP units, it is critical that Marines understand the necessity of utilizing that support both in training and in the conduct of operations. This can be facilitated through the establishment of habitual training relationships with the U.S. Army's 4th PSYOP Group (Ft Bragg), to ensure the inclusion of PSYOP planners with the MEF headquarters and tactical loudspeaker teams with the MEUs in Marine exercises and wargaming as a routine practice. During operations, maneuver units should request PSYOP planners and forces through appropriate channels as early as possible and integrate them into planning and operations.

[94] JP 3-53, V-7.

In order to produce the right message or action, PSYOP is based on two critically important pillars: an understanding of and respect for the culture of the people, and the ability to articulate the truth. PSYOP specialists speak the languages of particular countries, are sensitive to the cultural factors relating to the people (history, customs, social norms, religion, etc.), know what to avoid so as to not offend the people, and know what things to say and do in order to show respect and understanding. PSYOP uses only the truth to insure that the audience trusts the source and believes the message. That audience may not like the source or the message, but their ability to believe that message is critical to shaping their behavior in a way that benefits mission accomplishment.[95]

What does the PSYOP message say? It can explain the rationale for why the US and coalition forces are operating in a country. It may let people know what is taking place during an operation, to highlight what US and coalition forces are doing, as compared with the actions the local government, its leaders, and military forces are taking. The message may explain any rules of behavior that have been established, inform the population where it can go for aid (food, shelter, and medicine), or tell the people what they can do for their own safety (e.g. procedures for approaching checkpoints). Finally, it may tell the population how it can assist US and coalition forces or tell military forces how to surrender.

In its totality, PSYOP is the synergistic effect achieved in combining the messages sent through each of the various media forms with the messages sent through collective US political-military actions taken (such as deploying forces, dropping bombs, issuing diplomatic demarches, enforcing embargoes, and freezing property and finances). For this reason, however, it is often difficult to precisely measure the impact of PSYOP on the battlefield and within the indigenous population.

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[95] The criticality of using the truth in PSYOP does not mean efforts are not made to deceive an enemy during military operations through PSYOP. PSYOP was clearly used to support deception operations during the 1991 Gulf War by convincing the Iraqi military that US Marines were going to conduct a beach-assault on Kuwait.

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